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Abstract
In evaluating the role of international law, most scholarship focuses on how international
laws, treaties and courts function and are enforced. However, to best understand how
international laws are created, as well as how they are internalized within individual countries’
judicial systems, it is also necessary to look at the normative side of international law. This
project applies the theory of transnational legal process to examine how recognized international
norms are uniquely recognized by different legal systems. More specifically, I analyze how
political culture affects the level of consistency between international privacy norms and
domestic law through the study of judicial decisions from United States Supreme Court and the
French Court of Cassation. I conclude that the cases studied indicate a correlation between
political culture and the manner in which international privacy norms are recognized and applied.
Although political culture does not lead to significantly different conceptions of privacy rights
and the protections they deserve, it does affect the process through which understandings of
privacy evolve in response to new technology.
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Chapter One: Introduction
One of the many discussions to come out of the Edward Snowden revelations in June
2013 is how understandings of privacy differ within the international community. The Snowden
revelations, which highlighted the scope of the surveillance policies by the United States
National Security Agency (NSA), led to a negative reaction within the international community,
particularly the European Union, and sparked a discussion about how understandings of privacy
have evolved in an increasingly digitalized world. Within six months of the Snowden incident,
the United Nations (U.N.) passed a resolution regarding the “right to privacy in the digital age,”
holding that states have a “responsibility to protect human rights.”1 This newfound attention to
privacy as a human right demonstrates a normative shift within the international community. But
what are the current norms and how are they shifting? The oldest and most widely-recognized
mention of privacy by the U.N. comes from The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), which was adopted in 1948. Article 12 of the UDHR reads, “No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”2
As mentioned earlier, the international community re-examined the question of privacy in
2013 in light of the extent of the NSA’s digital surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden, as the
U.N. evaluated how technological advances have affected a modern definition of privacy.3 On
June 30, 2014, the U.N. released a report entitled, “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age”
detailing how member states should recognize and protect privacy. The report recognizes that
“digital surveillance may engage a State’s human rights obligations if that surveillance involves
the State’s exercise of power or effective control in relation to digital communications
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infrastructure,” meaning that limitations on the State’s exercise of power apply to digital
surveillance as they would for any other state action with the potential to violate human rights.4
The report also emphasizes the importance of proportionality between the government interest in
national security or criminal justice and the privacy rights of the individuals; as such, the least
invasive method possible for a desired end must be used.5
Furthermore, in November 2014, the United Nations passed a second resolution on
privacy that recalled a resolution from December 2013. The earlier treaty noted the need for a
right to digital privacy, acknowledged the Human Rights Council’s adoption of the June
resolution, and provided more specific definition of the right to digital privacy. The new
resolution emphasizes the legal obligation of states to “respect international human rights law
when they intercept private communications directly or extract personal data from a company.”6
The report also recognizes the “global and open nature of the Internet and the rapid advancement
in information and communication technologies,” while affirming that “the same rights that
people have offline must also be protected online.”7 The reports from June and November 2014,
which are indicative of current international norms, recognize that privacy rights apply equally to
digital communications and information. As such, government action that uses digital
surveillance must act in accordance with previous laws designed to protect human rights such as
privacy.
However, while the international norms regarding privacy in the digital age are being
further defined, there remains, as demonstrated by the United States’ NSA surveillance policies,
a lack of uniformity in terms of how individual countries interpret privacy issues. Different
political structures could possibly explain violations of internationally recognized privacy rights
in countries with dictatorial governments where human rights abuses are more common.
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However, as the media following the Snowden revelations revealed, the lack of international
uniformity in terms of privacy law also differs between countries with similar democratic
political structures, such as the United States and France.8 This project seeks to understand if a
distinction truly exists between how domestic law in France and the United States recognizes
privacy law, but more importantly, why this distinction might exist. I hypothesize that internal
political culture, as represented by a state’s federal judiciary, affects the extent to which states
internalize international norms within their own laws. While this project looks only at the United
States and France, the conclusions regarding the effects of political culture may be relevant to
understanding discrepancies between international and domestic law in other countries, and
potentially other issues.
To account for this cultural aspect, this project extends beyond studying solely the
relationship between international law and domestic law, where international law acts as an
independent variable that affects domestic law, the dependent variable. A third variable, political
culture, is added as a conditional variable on this relationship because I hypothesize that political
culture alters the manner in which international law translates to domestic law. While political
culture can be interpreted in numerous ways, I look specifically at the foundational legal
documents, most notably the constitutions, within each state, as well as the philosophical and
theoretical influences on each document. These documents provide the most relevant concept of
political culture for my study, as they illustrate how society’s cultural understanding of notions
such as privacy are then translated into the structure of the political system. Because documents
such as constitutions provide a basis for understanding political culture, I must use a form of
domestic law that is well connected to constitutional principles. Federal judicial decisions
provide this connection, as they involve justices interpreting constitutional principles to apply to
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new legal questions. I therefore, after analyzing the political culture of each state, apply a
comparative legal analysis to privacy cases within each state’s highest federal court in order to
understand how cultural conceptions affect the outcomes of these decisions.
I begin my study with a review of relevant international law scholarship in Chapter Two.
This chapter provides an overview of the relevant theoretical discussions about international law,
as well as how issues such as globalization have affected the discipline of international law.
Chapter Two also discusses transnational law as a new theoretical approach for understanding
laws that transcend national borders and includes a section in French to discuss relevant
francophone scholarship on international law. Following the discussion of relevant literature and
theory, Chapter Three delves into the methods I employ for applying these theories to my
research question. The methodology section further highlights what variables are being
investigated: political culture, international and domestic law, as well as how they are identified
and measured. In Chapter Four I define and explore my conditional variable, political culture, in
each country through an analysis of their constitutions, recognitions of protected individual
rights, and the influences on each. In Chapter Five I use this understanding of political culture to
review privacy cases from the United States Supreme Court. In Chapter Six I employ similar
methods to examine the relationship between French political culture and domestic law as
reflected in decisions by the French Court of Cassation. Finally, in Chapter Seven I analyze the
patterns from Chapters Four, Five and Six concerning how the countries are applying privacy
law, as well as how political culture affects these results. I am therefore able to draw conclusions
in relation to my hypothesis concerning the role of political culture.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Introduction
The topic of international law has certainly attracted a large amount of scholarship over
the past several centuries. This chapter draws from some of this scholarship to gain a greater
understanding of the relevant theories that exist surrounding international law. I begin with
literature providing a more traditional approach to international law, by touching upon the
international community’s recognition of international law in recent history, the generally
accepted sources of international law, and the traditional debates surrounding the topic. I then
turn to literature addressing the current issues with international law, particularly related to
globalization. This discussion transitions into a discussion of one of the most recent theoretical
approaches, transnational law, and more specifically, transnational legal process, which provides
a significant foundation for my own study. I end with an exploration of French literature on
international law in order to gain a more comprehensive view of how scholars address
international law, both currently and historically, on a more global level in order to see the
theoretical differences that exist.

International Law
History of International Law
Many scholars consider Hugo Grotius to be the father of modern international law
because of his publication De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (On the Laws of War and Peace) in 1625. In
his writing Grotius emphasizes the importance of morality and justice as obligations within
international society, thus providing the foundation for a series of “laws of nations”. However,
Grotius was not the first to write on this topic; he drew many of his ideas from Spanish
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theologians such as Vitoria and Suarez, among others. These earlier theologians focused on the
inherent laws that they believed guided states as a result of the Catholic Church. Grotian theory
differed from these precedents by providing a “secularized” approach to these laws, where states
may be bound by certain rules not because of the Church but because of an inherent sense of
morality and justice within society.1
Hersch Lauterpacht notes several key components of Grotian legal theory in his essay
recognizing the tercentenary of Grotius’ death. I will focus on two specific components on his
essay that are particularly relevant to an understanding of modern international law. First,
Grotius argues that international relations are completely subjected to the rule of law. Part of this
argument is the rejection of war as states’ absolute right but instead classifying just and unjust
war. Another key aspect of this “total subjection” is religiously based, as Grotius, unlike the
theologians before him, held that all international relations, not only the relations between
Christian states, could be guided by treaties.2 While this seems less significant in modern times,
it demonstrated the important universality of international law and also helps highlight why
Grotius became such a significant theorist compared to those before him.
A second component of Grotian theory is his recognition of natural law as a source of
international law. While Grotius recognizes the importance of sovereign lawmakers as well as
treaties and rules upon which states expressly agree, he also recognizes the importance of natural
law as an independent source of law.3 Natural law is best understood as “claims of a universal
consciousness of justice” or rules that, while unspoken or unwritten, still apply as law to all.4
Grotius applies natural law in an international context by arguing that states are bound by both
“the law of nations and the law of nature”. Thus, a state may be bound to act in a certain way, not
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because of an explicit contract with another state, by which the involved parties consented to be
bound, but because there is a higher law that binds all.5
To further understand how international law originated and the significance of Grotian
theory, it is beneficial to turn to the classic theoretical debate regarding the sources and nature of
law. Legal theorists have traditionally been separated into two camps: natural lawyers and legal
positivists. Natural lawyers, as previously mentioned, look to undefined norms and morals as
sources of law that bind all humans. Legal positivists, on the other hand, claim law is simply
what a sovereign decides it to be; if there is no sovereign, there can be no law.6 Positivism is best
represented by the writings of John Austin, who argued: “laws proper or properly so called are
commands: laws which are not commands, are laws improperly so called.”7 Furthermore, Austin
notes the importance of who creates the laws and to whom those laws apply, as every law “is set
by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body..., to a member or members of the independent
political society wherein that person or body is sovereign.”8 International law is, through this
traditional Austinian lens, not really law because there are not specifically commanded rules or
creators of rules, but rather a series of interpreted norms designed to guide state behavior.9
This theoretical dichotomy is seen in Grotius’ conception of international law,
specifically because he finds a balance between both natural and positive law. In recognizing that
all states are bound by certain higher laws of justice, but that most international law is still
specifically enumerated and consented to, Grotius acknowledges both sides. This has in some
ways contributed to the debate between positivists and natural lawyers about international law, as
both sides attempt to interpret Grotian theory in their favor. These two theoretical approaches
therefore remain relevant to the modern debate surrounding international law. British lawyer
William Edward Hall contrasts approaches to international law within this framework, claiming
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that one conception, the natural law approach, included “logical applications of principles of
right to international relations,” whereas the second conception, the positivist approach, looked
to “the concrete rules actually in use.”10 Each of these conceptions reflects one of the two main
components of Grotian international law mentioned previously.
The debate behind international law goes beyond looking at how it should be defined to
include a debate of whether international law is even authoritative as law. Because of the nature
of international law, and its application on states in a global arena rather than on individuals
within a society, scholars have raised doubts about the legitimacy of international law as an
actual form of law. In his essay “The Concept of Law,” H.L.A. Hart addresses these doubts and
proposes theoretical approaches to resolve them. Hart identifies two primary doubts concerning
international law. First, international law, unlike municipal law, lacks the necessary backing of
threats to be enforceable. This doubt arises from the positivist concern that unless law is backed
by threat or organized sanctions, it will not be considered binding by the group to whom it
applies.11 Hart then argues that law, whether municipal or international, gains recognition and
therefore adherence through practice and general pressure for conformity. Although some states
may not always follow international laws, just as some individuals may not always follow
municipal laws, this does not negate their legitimacy. Therefore without being backed by
authoritative threats, Hart argues that international laws may still be binding if they are generally
accepted and followed by the international community.12
Second, Hart addresses the other core positivist concern about international law: because
states are sovereign entities, they cannot be bound by a greater authority such as international
law. However, Hart refutes this doubt by emphasizing that a state is bound by no law but yet is
the source of law for its subjects, as each state has both a population living within certain borders
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being held to a consistent set of laws and a government with a certain level of independence.
However, this independence is not absolute and there are many degrees of independence and
dependence between states. Hart notes that this is represented by the existence of colonies,
protectorates, and confederations. By moving away from this traditional view of the ‘state’ it is
possible to move beyond the notion that states cannot be bound by international law or can only
be bound by certain forms of international law.13
Legal scholar David Kennedy further concentrates on the sources of international law,
highlighting how the “source doctrine” approach provides a framework for understanding how
states apply international law.14 Kennedy cites Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, which acknowledges four legal sources. First, international conventions establish
definitive rules between states, for example, specific treaties between countries. Second, there
are international customs, which are created by “general practice accepted as law.” Third,
Kennedy lists “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” which, similarly to
international customs, is an inherently normative source. Fourth, judicial decisions and the
findings in highly respected and qualified academia may also be used as a means of determining
the rule of law in an international context.15 Kennedy’s arguments thus reflect a more Grotian
approach to the origins of international law, as he cites both positivist and natural law sources.
Kennedy also classifies sources of international law in another manner, by differentiating
between “hard” and “soft” sources. “Hard” sources involve the consent of the parties involved,
making them binding and therefore easier to enforce. These include international conventions
and judicial decisions, the first and fourth sources of international law previously discussed by
Kennedy. “Soft” sources, however, do not require the consent of states involved but rather are
based upon international norms that the international community expects states to follow. They
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include international customs and general principles accepted as law, the second and third
sources defined by Kennedy. “Soft” sources of law are more complicated to enforce because it
becomes easy for the state accused of breaking the “law” to argue that it has “a different idea of
softness” or “a different image of the system of justice.”16 In looking at “soft” sources of law,
Kennedy takes a similar approach as Hart in holding that laws may still be held as legally
binding as long as they are acknowledged and followed by a significant part of the international
community. A source doctrine approach to international law is therefore about more than the
concrete written treaties binding states to certain behavior, but also the more abstract notions of
norms and customs that can be used to persuade states to conform to internationally accepted
behavior. It therefore finds a middle ground between the natural and positive law theories.

Normative International Law
Scholars often have looked to jus cogens norms, also called peremptory norms, when
analyzing normative effects on state behavior. These norms, which create the “soft” sources of
law discussed by Kennedy, are one of the most controversial sources of international law.
Scholar Larry May argues that this is because jus cogens norms imply that “there are
international normative standards that govern how States act within their own borders and
toward their own subjects” and that these norms “hold true for all States, perhaps at all times.”17
Because of the universal nature of these norms, May argues that they can be used to prohibit
certain actions, such as genocide, for all members of the international community, and can justify
an international response if violated. This concept of officially recognizing international norms
as binding determinants of international action first originated in Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention in 1969. According to Article 53, a treaty may be declared as void if it conflicts with
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a “peremptory norm”, or “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”18 This
definition and application of jus cogens norms is significant because it allows a “soft” source of
international law to supersede a “hard” source of international law if the treaty in question
violates a norm. May’s interpretation of the significance of jus cogens norms therefore supports a
notion of international law where natural law may supersede positive international law.
The heart of the controversy surrounding jus cogens norms can thus be reflected by the
debate between positive and natural law. In applying legal positivism to international law, May
argues that because there is no international sovereign creating laws, there are no binding
international laws. However, he also references Hart’s philosophy because, although Hart is
typically identified as a legal positivist, he does identify a minimal level of moral and legal
norms within a legal society. As noted earlier, this perspective allows Hart to acknowledge
certain normative international law as binding.19 While less extreme legal positivists such as Hart
may be willing to accept minimal normative law, positivists generally disregard international
law, particularly when normative international law is used to negate more recognized laws and
treaties.
On the other end of legal theoretical spectrum, natural law also can be used to understand
the discussion behind the legitimacy of international legal norms, or jus cogens norms. As part of
her critique of international law, Hazel Fox applies natural legal theory to better explain jus
cogens norms. She first defines natural law as laws that are not created by a specific person or
group but are inherent to the legal system. Jus cogens norms are a form of natural law because
they represent universal moral and ethical ideas that are recognized but not specifically created
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by states.20 The controversy behind international normative law can therefore be understood
through the dichotomy of these two principal legal theories. If interpreting law from a positivist
approach, international law, or more specifically jus cogens norms, is highly problematic
because they cannot be truly created as laws and therefore cannot persuade legal action.
However, if analyzing laws from a natural law approach, international law is plausible through
jus cogens norms because it is reasonable to use universal moral and ethical beliefs to guide
either individual or state behavior.
However, there is another aspect of normative international law, aside form its authority,
that creates issues in terms of implementation. Although scholar Jagdish Bhagwati primarily
addresses economic globalization, he does look at shortcomings within international normative
law as part of his analysis. According to Bhagwati, the extent to which international norms are
dictated into specific behavioral expectations affects how well they are accurately implemented
by state actors. While domestic legislation and executive orders are generally more clearly
defined, normative or “customary” international law is often broadly stated. This allows states to
conform to international norms simply by “interpreting” them in a favorable way. It also creates
controversy within the international system because the conformance of a state to customary
laws is highly dependent on who is interpreting the laws.21 Bhagwati’s concern about the
universality and implementation of international norms undermines a key component of natural
lawyers’ defense of international law. According to natural legal theory, there are unwritten but
universal codes of conduct that all individuals and states are bound to; if this is true, then there
would not be room for such varied interpretation of international norms.
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International Law and Sovereignty
To understand how these more theoretical notions are practically applied to the global
political system, it is necessary to understand sovereignty and its role in interstate systems. In his
lecture “The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International System and the
Challenge to International Law”, Daniel Bethlehem provides a background to historical
conceptions of sovereignty, highlighting the “Westphalian system of inter-state law.”22 This
system, born from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, centered on sovereign states whose
interactions would be regulated by law. It is thus fundamental to the study of laws between states
to first understand sovereignty as it applies within state borders. State sovereignty, as described
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, “rests fundamentally on the notion of exclusive
authority over discrete parcels of territory,” and includes the freedom to make economic,
political, financial, and other decisions within state borders.23 But why is sovereignty significant
for studying international law? Bethlehem examines sovereignty as it relates to a state’s
jurisdiction, or “the authority of a state to govern persons, conduct, and property by its municipal
law.”24 In this way, Bethlehem defines sovereignty as fitting into Hart’s traditional notion of the
state by arguing that states have traditionally been given legal authority within their own
territory. As a result, sovereignty, and therefore the application of a legal system, is inherently
related to geography. As we begin to look at legal issues beyond state borders, state sovereignty
and the jurisdiction it creates must still be considered, but they are no longer sufficient legal
determinants. This is a particularly relevant consideration for my research project as it is
necessary to analyze how issues, such as electronic data surveillance and privacy, that transcend
state borders form international norms and law that must still be addressed by domestic legal
systems within determined state borders.
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Globalization and Challenges to International Law
Because of the significance of state borders and the sovereignty they represent,
globalization has become a key consideration when looking at how states currently interact. This
is equally true for the study of international law. A major aspect of globalization has been
increased mobility, whether of individuals, of ideas, or of commercial goods. The increase in
international interactions has led to a shift in the role of international law; recent international
legal studies thus focus increasingly on globalization’s effects on sovereign states and
international institutions.25 While Bethlehem, for example, does not argue that geography and
borders will become obsolete, he emphasizes how transnational activity has increased as a result
of globalization. Previous notions of territoriality may therefore not provide the adequate
framework to address international legal issues in the future.26 In other words, he concludes,
globalization will not completely uproot existing international legal framework, but may require
a fresh approach.
Bethlehem also touches on specific aspects of international law that, as a result of
globalization, must be re-evaluated in order to remain relevant. First, international organizations
and institutions still reflect territorial notions of international law, making them inadequate to
address more modern legal issues facing the legal community, such as electronic
communications. Bethlehem adds that is may be necessary to create a ‘deemed jurisdiction’ to
address questions, for example cyber security, that fall outside a traditional geographic space.27
Second, he notes that the international community lacks sufficient processes for the creation and
implementation of laws. Because the international community lacks these standard procedures,
legal practice and legal interpretations within states become flexible and inconsistent. This
concern is similar to Bhagwati’s commentary on international norms, as both scholars argue that
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states will interpret international law in the manner that benefits them. In order to adapt to the
constantly changing global environment, the international legal system must be able to
efficiently reform laws.28 As the international community becomes increasingly entwined, with
fewer issues confined only to within state borders, there will be an increased burden on
international law to adapt and properly address these legal questions.
Rafael Domingo further expands upon the challenges facing international law and how
the international legal system must evolve with the global community.29 Domingo, like
Bethlehem, emphasizes that the international law will no longer remain relevant in the future if it
continues to focus on political concepts such as sovereignty, territoriality, and the individual
nation-state.30 However, he takes a more radical approach to the future of international law, by
arguing that we must move away from a system of international law based on sovereign states
and toward a system of global law.31 More specifically, he states, “sovereignty – along with the
concept of territorial jurisdiction – has run its course and done so successfully” but that “the new
global order and the paradigm shift in international relations require a new legal framework, built
on a series of global principles that go beyond the mold and limitations of the state-based
model.”32 It is thus not only the current international legal structures that cannot properly
respond to globalization, but that the theoretical approach to both international relations and
international law must shift away from a focus on the nation-state.

Transnational Law
Response to Limitations of International Law
One core criticism of international law concerns the use of the word ‘international’
because the relationship it details, the interaction of sovereign states, may no longer be valid in
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the study of law. If actions beyond state borders occur increasing between individuals and
multinational corporations, the law governing these actions should no longer be defined in terms
of being between ‘nations’. Just as many scholars, such as Bethlehem and Domingo, critique
international law for its inability to adjust to an increasingly globalized world, others criticize the
use of “international law” to describe a global legal order that is no longer “international”. One
notable scholar with this latter viewpoint is Philip C. Jessup, who created the concept of
“transnational law” as a new approach to law in the global arena. The major difference between
international and transnational law is the main actors. While international law views sovereign
nations as the principal actors in the global legal system, transnational law looks at “individuals,
corporations, states, organizations of states, [and] other groups.”33 Because the variety of
possible actors in transnational situations, Jessup notes that transnational law encompasses both
public and private law, further defining it as “law which regulates actions or events that
transcend national frontiers.”34 Transnational law therefore differs from international law both in
terms of the actors involved as well as the types of law, public and private, that it can address.
In determining the practical application of transnational legal principles, Jessup turns first
to the issue of jurisdiction. With a previous international legal approach, jurisdiction was
inherently tied to sovereignty, as each state had jurisdiction within its own borders. International
law could influence state action, but only national laws could affect individual citizens.
International law thus only applies to individuals after it has been incorporated into a state’s
national laws.35 However, with transnational law, jurisdiction is less defined, an issue that Jessup
suggests can be resolved by moving away from a traditional territorial notion of jurisdiction. He
argues that “it would be the function of transnational law to reshuffle the cases and to deal out
jurisdiction in the manner most conducive to the needs and convenience of all members of the
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international community,” further noting that, “the fundamental approach would not start with
sovereignty or power but from the premise that jurisdiction is essentially a matter of procedure
which could be amicably arranged among the nations of the world.”36 Through the adoption of
transnational law, the international community can mutually create a new system of jurisdiction
that can better address issues both within and between states. A transnational approach therefore
creates solutions to some of the shortcomings of international law, particularly those related to
state sovereignty.
But how does transnational law differ from international law and how has this newer
conception of law remained relevant? In his paper discussing more recent conceptions of
transnational law, Craig Scott analyzes how Jessup’s concept of transnational law has evolved.
Prior to delving into these modern conceptions, Scott distinguishes transnational law from
international law, arguing, “while international law as interstate law is more or less the same as
talking about law between or amongst states, transnational law can variously connote law across
states, law beyond states, or law through states (i.e. states’ legal systems).”37 The changing
nature of interactions beyond state borders has thus necessitated a change in terminology for the
laws regulating these interactions. Similarly, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a law professor at
University of California Irvine argues that due to the increase in “ideas, people, services, and
goods [that] cross borders... ‘international’ law is no longer a subject for only the regulation of
inter-state activities.”38 Transnational law, therefore, is less a completely different area of law
and more a renaming of existing international law that better reflects the changed nature of these
more transnational interactions. Harold Koh also expands on the nature of these transnational
interactions, thus further defining transnational law. Through the use of metaphoric ‘computerage imagery’ he highlights three key ways in which transnational law operates. First, he holds
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that there are laws that are “downloaded from international to domestic law,” for example,
international norms that are internalized within a domestic legal system.39 Second, there are laws
that are “uploaded, then downloaded;” a domestic law or legal norm is incorporated into
international law, where it is then internalized by other states into their own legal systems.
Finally, there are laws that are “horizontally transplanted,” or transmitted directly from one
domestic legal system to another, thus bypassing the international law stage.40 Transnational law
therefore is centered on spread and internalization of norms into defined domestic or
international law.

Transnational Legal Process
To demonstrate how his conception of transnational law occurs in the global system, Koh
outlines the theory of transnational legal process. He defines transnational legal process as “the
theory and practice of how public and private actors – nation-states, international organizations,
and private individuals – interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international for
a state to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize the rule of transnational law.”41
According to Koh, transnational legal process has four distinct characteristics. First, it is
nontraditional in the sense that it eliminates standard dichotomies within international legal
studies, most notably the distinction between public and private law, as well as between domestic
and international law. Second, it is nonstatist as it looks at actors other than traditional nationstates. Third, it is dynamic and can shift as legal norms shift. Fourth, it is normative and
therefore created and adapted by the accepted international norms.42 In demonstrating these four
aspects, Koh also outlines how this legal process is the result of the evolution of both
international legal studies as well as international relations scholarship. While this theory builds
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upon Jessup’s notion of transnational law by highlighting how it applies to the current
international community, Koh does not significantly highlight the future of transnational law,
and thus does not address Jessup’s argument about jurisdiction. Therefore, in using transnational
legal process within my own study, I will only look at jurisdictions as they currently exist rather
than analyzing how they could shift to better address issues of privacy. Koh’s acceptance of
current jurisdictions also reflects a lingering respect, at least to a certain extent, for the notion of
sovereignty that is so central to transnational international legal theory.
In his article, “Transnational Legal Process and State Change,” Gregory Shaffer further
expands on this definition of transnational legal process, first by tying it back to the roots of
law.43 Shaffer emphasizes that all law is, and has been in the recent past, transnational. American
law, for example, originates from Roman law and English common law. More recently, it has
evolved from both economic and cultural transnational interactions. Increased transnational
interactions lead to spread of certain legal norms and the creation of “transnational legal orders”
where accepted legal norms then govern specific areas of law.44 Shaffer thus defines
transnational legal process as “the process through which transnational construction and
conveyance of legal norms takes place.”45 Shaffer also notes that the intersection of transnational
legal processes with national or local legal processes can “block, adapt, translate, or appropriate
a transnational legal norm and spur its reassessment.”46 To clarify the process, transnational legal
processes are the recognition and spread of international legal norms, which, when sufficiently
articulated and applied, can become transnational legal orders.47 In looking more specifically at
how international laws and norms are reflected nationally through transnational legal process,
Shaffer argues that “transnational legal process is not reduced to a process of filling in gaps in
law’s implementation, but rather seen in dynamic terms in which national, international, and
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transnational political, social, and legal processes interact.”48 Transnational legal process can
therefore provide an important theoretical approach for understanding both how law has evolved
with the rise of globalization and how legal systems adapt to international norms.
Transnational legal process also provides a foundation for answering the question of why
states only sometimes obey international laws and treaties. Traditionally scholars have analyzed
this question by looking primarily at the interests and the identity of the state; however, Koh
argues that neither of these fully accounts for the ‘normativity’ of transnational legal process.49
Instead, Koh looks to the concepts of interaction and internalization as potential factors.
Interaction can better describe the tendency of a state to follow international law than solely
identity, as repeated interactions between state actors make up a large portion of the international
laws that states obey. States are encouraged to obey because failure to do so creates friction and
hinders participation in the international community.50 Similarly, state obedience to international
law can also be explained by the concept of internalization because, “as transnational actors
interact, they create patterns of behavior and generate norms of external conduct which they in
turn internalize.” This process of internalization results in international norms being incorporated
into domestic law, further ensuring that the state will follow them. States can internalize norms
through “executive action, legislation, and judicial decisions which take account of and
incorporate international norms.”51 In transnational legal process, norms are therefore created
through interactions, incorporated into a state’s domestic law and then obeyed through the
process of internalization.
There are thus several reasons why transnational law and transnational legal process
provide the best theoretical foundation for a study of the implementation of privacy law. First,
with constant technological advances regarding the internet and digitally stored information,
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issues related to privacy are no longer confined to national borders. Similarly, there are
numerous relevant actors, such as multinational companies and individuals, and not just states.
As a result, the laws and norms pertaining to privacy issues will be increasingly transnational in
nature and transnational legal theory provides the best framing for understanding them. Because
my study looks at how international norms and law related to privacy are internalized by
domestic legal systems, transnational legal process will also be a relevant theoretical approach.
However, this approach to my research question does not completely deviate from the traditional
international law concepts, but rather, through a transnational law approach, builds off of core
concepts of international. Most notably, the notion of sovereignty remains a pertinent
consideration in analyzing the decisions of domestic courts in the United States and in France.

Revue de la littérature scientifique française
Pour une compréhension complète d’un sujet international il faut étudier des spécialistes
internationales en dehors de la communauté anglophone. Alors, en cherchant une meilleure
compréhension du droit international, j’étudie les travaux des spécialistes de droit qui
s’expriment en français. Cette partie de la revue de littérature scientifique française examine des
thèmes principaux à propos du droit international. Ces thèmes incluent le débat entre le droit
naturel et le droit positif, l’évolution du sujet du droit international, et l’influence croissante du
droit international au secteur privé. Je compare aussi les idées des auteurs français avec celles
des auteurs anglophone pour déterminer une meilleure compréhension des thèmes généraux des
spécialistes du droit international, quelque soit leurs pays d’origine. Cette partie souligne
premièrement l’histoire du droit international, en discutant les travaux de Marie-Hélène Renaut
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et J. de Louter. Deuxièmement, on analyse l’effet de la mondialisation sur le droit international
comme souligné par les travaux de Robert Kolb et Jean-Bernard Auby.

Histoire du droit international
En construisant une histoire générale du droit international, Marie-Hélène Renaut
commence avec la création de l’idée moderne du « droit des gens » qui vient de Francisco
Suarez, un théologien espagnol actif à la fin du XVIe et au début du XVIIe siècles. Suarez a
souligné qu’il existe une communauté universelle entres les hommes, et selon l’interprétation de
Renaut, il y a « le droit des gens… qui régit cette communauté. »52 Ce droit des gens peuvent
être divisé en deux catégories : le droit des gens naturel et le droit des gens positif. Ces
catégories suivent les principes générales des théories légales discutées dans la première section
du travail présent. C’est à dire que le droit de gens naturel représente une « norme supérieure »
qui existe pour tous. De l’autre côté, le ‘droit positif des gens’ est évolutif et vient des coutumes
mais, aux yeux de Suarez, doit s’adapter au droit naturel.53 Comme Mark Janis a discuté, Suarez
était aussi un des théologiens principaux qui a inspiré Grotius.54 Alors, ses idées du ‘droit des
gens’ sont pertinents à l’analyse de la théorie Grotian du droit international.
Renaut exprime, de la même façon que Janis, que Grotius a donné un aspect de
positivisme au droit de gens tel qu’il avait été formulée par Suarez. Aux mots de Renaut, Grotius
a été considéré le fondateur du droit international à cause de son vue que « le droit des gens est
un ensemble de règles positives issues d’un accord entre les peuples. »55 Avec cette notion,
Grotius ajoute un degré de positivisme au droit des gens déterminé avant par Suarez. À part de
l’explication plus théorique de Grotius, ce qui est assez similaire aux analyses de Janis et
Lauterpacht, Renault explique aussi deux sources principales de cette théorie de Grotius.
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Premièrement, selon Renaut, Grotius a été influencé par les concepts libéraux. Dans son œuvre,
Du droit de la guerre et de la paix, il crée les règles que déterminent quand un pays peut faire la
guerre. Ce droit de guerre crée les causes justes pour faire la guerre ainsi que les conditions pour
la neutralité et le traitement des prisonniers.56 Ces directives d’action internationale représentent
une mélange de droit naturel et de droit positif qui oblige la communauté au droit supranational.
Les notions de Grotius illustraient aussi les idées principales du libéralisme, c’est à dire qu’on
peut régler et limiter les pays d’un niveau supranational pour diminuer la fréquence de la guerre.
Deuxièmement, la théorie de Grotius du droit international a aussi des origines dans les
considérations plus réalistes et traditionnels. Pour Grotius, la motivation de ses théories n’était
pas seulement académique, mais « en grande partie commandée par le système économique qui
règle le commerce. »57 Grotius, comme une juriste en Hollande, devait aussi considérer la
croissance de l’économie hollandaise. La création du droit international n’était pas, par
conséquent, seulement à la poursuite des motivations libérales telles que la protection des droits
des gens ou pour éviter la guerre. Les considérations économiques et les avantages commerciales
d’un système plus régulé ont provoqué aussi la création du droit international. Par exemple, le
droit maritime était un des sujets particulièrement importants à Grotius parce que la Hollande
était à ce temps là un pays colonial. Les actions commerciaux maritimes affectaient l’économie
et donc les affaires importantes de la Hollande.58 Avec le droit international concernant ces
actions maritimes, la Hollande pouvait agir sur ses intérêts nationaux signifiants. Dans ce
contexte, la poursuite des lois internationaux s’adapte non seulement aux idées plus libérales
mais aussi au concepts réalistes. Dans le contexte de mon étude, un point de vue réaliste peut être
encore pertinent parce qu’on doit considérer comment les intérêts nationaux des pays, et non
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seulement les pressions internationales, peuvent influencer les pays à appliquer le droit
international.
Avec la reconnaissance du droit international à cette époque d’histoire, le débat classique
légal apparaît : le droit international est-il un exemple du droit naturel ou du droit positif ? Dans
une histoire du droit international classique, J. de Louter souligne ce débat classique de droit. De
Louter exprime que ce type de droit n’est pas différent que les autres classifications de droit au
sens que les deux perspectives peuvent s’appliquer.59 Mais, comme H.L.A. Hart, il se penche
vers une compréhension plus positiviste. De Louter note que le droit international peut être
classifié comme positif parce qu’il n’est pas seulement philosophique ou morale, et il est plus
qu’une partie de l’histoire ou de la politique. Le droit international influence ces domaines, et
donc, doit être considéré comme un concept unique. La conclusion de Louter est claire : « le
droit international n’est point un aventurier sans abri qui trouve çà et là un pauvre gîte, mais un
fils légitime, qui mérite une place honorable dans la grande famille du droit. »60 C’est à dire que
le droit international n’est pas un concept abstrait qui existe conjointement avec des autres types
de droit, mais qu’il mérite une reconnaissance unique comme une approche indépendante aux
question légales. Bien qu’il a un point de vue très positif, l’argument représente le changement
idéologique du début du XXe siècle en faveur du droit international.

L’Effet de la mondialisation sur le droit international
Cette nouvelle perspective sur le droit international continue à évoluer, et est surtout
influencée par la croissance de la mondialisation. La mondialisation n’est pas un concept récent,
alors comment peut-on le définir au contexte plus courant ? Politologue français Jean-Bernard
Auby qui écrit de l’influence de la mondialisation l’explique comme la croissance des
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interactions transnationales : les interactions économiques, politiques, ou de communication en
général.61 Robert Kolb, un professeur de droit international à plusieurs universités, analyse
l’influence de la mondialisation sur ces changements idéologiques dans le domaine du droit
international. D’abord, Kolb explique la nature traditionnelle du droit international à la fin du
XIXe siècle avec une description similaire à la théorie classique de Grotius. Mais, il note qu’à
cette époque-là le droit international était « lié à l’appartenance à une société fermée, dont on ne
devenait pas automatiquement membre, mais à laquelle on devait admis par cooptation. »62 Il
utilise les exemples de la Turquie et de la Chine, et du développement de leurs relations avec les
pays européens pendant ce siècle, pour montrer comment cette cooptation s’est effectuée.
Au cours du XXe siècle, le système a changé profondément à cause de la croissance de la
mondialisation et de la création des organisations internationales, pendant une phase que Kolb
appelle « la ‘constitutionnalisation’ du droit international ».63 Dans cette phase, qui est marqué
par la création des organisations supranationales comme la Société des Nations, et puis les
Nations Unies, on a commencé à considérer le droit international comme une doctrine pour un
système global, et non plus seulement pour les relations entre un petit nombre de pays. Comme
Larry May, un philosophe américain, Kolb souligne le rôle du positivisme juridique dans le droit
international traditionnel, mais il insiste que cette école de pensée a dû évoluer pendant la phase
de constitutionnalisation. Cette phase s’oppose aux doctrines principales de positivisme,
particulièrement celles qui déterminent qui peut créer les lois.64 En même temps, il est dans cette
phase que, selon Louter, la perspective positiviste du droit international ajoute aussi la légitimité
au droit international. Cette phase est donc marqué par plusieurs nouvelles perspectives et
idéologies en évolution, et même en contradiction, sur les sources du droit international.
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Un autre changement théorique pendant cette époque est le sujet du droit international.
Pendant le phase classique du droit international, le sujet du droit était l’état ; mais, dans cette
nouvelle phase, « l’individu est aussi devenu un sujet du droit international : d’où un mouvement
mondial des droits de l’homme. »65 Kolb souligne l’importance de ce deuxième changement
théorique parce que le droit international n’était plus simplement les règles des relations
internationales mais aussi des normes légales créées à l’égard des individus. Dans ce sens,
«l’écran étatique est percé : ce qui auparavant relevait exclusivement de la compétence intérieure
– le fameux domaine réservé – des États devait une matière régie (partiellement) part le droit
international. »66 Alors, cette phase représente deux changements signifiants : la création du droit
international normatif et la reconnaissance légale des individus plutôt que seulement les états.
L’évolution du droit international pendant le dernier siècle représente non seulement la
croissance de la mondialisation, mais aussi des changements aux théories légales à l’égard du
système international et de ses lois.
Ce changement de théorie légale est signifiant pour Jean-Bernard Auby dans son étude
sur la ‘globalisation’ du droit. En général, Auby affirme que la mondialisation a provoqué le
droit international à être plus privatisé, au sens qu’il est créé plus souvent pour le secteur privé.
Faisant référence à Gunther Teubner, Auby écrit, « le centre de gravité du droit se déplace vers
des régimes privés, et le droit global s’appuie de plus en plus sur des ressources autonomes :
multinationales, consultants juridiques globaux, fonds, associations, etc. »67 Cet argument suit le
raisonnement de Kolb à propos du sujet du droit international ; si le sujet du droit international a
décalé des états aux individus, il suivrait que le droit international en évoluant, influencerait le
secteur privé et non seulement des relations internationales au domaine public. Auby écrit sur
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plusieurs aspects du droit international avec cette perspective, mais c’est sa discussion du droit
international normatif qui est particulièrement pertinente à cette étude.
En discutant la création du droit international normatif, il fait référence à la croissance du
droit international privé. Il existe récemment un accroissement des sources du droit
international ; une partie de cet accroissement est le résultat de plusieurs organisations
internationaux, mais une autre partie importante est provoquée par le secteur privé et
l’accroissement des transactions internationales. Il y a des soucis que la multitude des sources
diminuerait la légitimité du droit international, mais Auby propose une autre hypothèse. Il
soutient que, « il y a au contraire prolifération de normes. »68 La croissance du commerce
international, une des conséquences de la mondialisation, provoque la création des normes
légales au domaine international.
Pour décrire comment les normes relient aux organisations du droit Auby utilise les
classifications des règles primaires (c’est à dire, les règles de la société) et des règles secondaires
(c’est à dire, les règles qui créent des règles primaires), une philosophie que vient de H.L.A.
Hart. Auby affirme que les normes internationales agissent comme les règles primaire et dictent
les actions certains aux individus et aux pays. Les organisations du droit, de l’autre côté, agissent
comme les règles secondaires parce qu’ils créent un système duquel les normes peuvent
émerger.69 Cependant, en proposant cette théorie, Auby présente aussi des soucis avec une
approche trop simple parce la création du droit international reste un processus compliqué. La
complication principale, selon lui, est un problème de distinction. La distinction entre les
législateurs et les exécutifs qui existe au niveau national n’existe pas si clairement au niveau
international. Similairement, la distinction entre le niveau national et le niveau international n’est
pas toujours claire ; il y a une « mélange de droit international et de droit interne. »70 Par

29
conséquent, les normes qui sont créées dans le système international sont souvent très générales
parce qu’elles doivent s’appliquer aux plusieurs pays avec des systèmes juridiques différents.
Alors, il y a des grandes divergences au niveau national parce que les pays peuvent interpréter
les mêmes normes dans les façons différents.71 Cet argument est pertinent à ce projet parce qu’il
suggère qu’il y a des facteurs au niveau national qui mènent aux interprétations différents aux
pays quand ils sont confrontés avec les mêmes normes internationales.

Conclusion
This chapter illustrates a theoretical shift in how scholars approach the topic of
international law. This theoretical shift is primarily the result of recent globalization, the increase
global interactions, especially between individuals and businesses. Interactions continue to
transcend state borders and involve non-state actors, leaving traditional international law, or the
laws governing the actions of sovereign states, increasingly outdated. As some scholars, such as
Daniel Bethlehem and Rafael Domingo, highlight the downfalls with the current international
legal system, other scholars, such as Phillip Jessup and Harold Koh, propose “transnational law”
as a better theoretical framework for understanding and governing global interactions. Harold
Koh also proposes the theory of transnational legal process, in which international law is created
and subsequently internalized within domestic law. The French literature provides a similar
perspective on international law, although Auby’s analysis of globalization and international law
provides a more positive outlook on how international normative law functions within the
current system. While French scholarship has not addressed transnational law in the manner that
Anglophone scholarship has, the discussions of international law by both Auby and Kolb touch
on many of the same key notions of transnational law, such as the role of international norms and
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the process of internalization. This suggests that the core ideas of transnational law are more
widespread globally than they may seem; there may simply be an issue of scholars
internationally not yet adopting the term “transnational”. Overall, Koh’s theory of transnational
legal process provides the best framework for understanding my own question, as it looks at how
international and domestic laws interact.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
This project seeks to understand the relationship between domestic and international law,
with special attention to political culture’s effect on this relationship. Although traditional
scholarship on international law has suggested a positivist, top-down approach to international
law, in which considerable tension exists between international laws and the national laws
created by sovereign states, Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process suggests a more
fluid relationship between the two forms of law. Koh’s theory suggests a more a cyclical and
normative manner of understanding international (or ‘transnational’) law in which different
national laws and norms converge to influence the creation of international law. These
international laws are in turn internalized back into domestic legal systems for a more
standardized recognition of international norms. Because I am most interested in the second part
of this cycle, how international norms are incorporated into domestic law, my study employs a
careful analysis of the current international standards concerning privacy and technology as well
as how law in France and the United States responds to these questions.1 However, it is not only
the differences between international and domestic privacy law, or between French and
American privacy law, that are of interest but how political culture affects these difference. I
argue that aspects of a state’s political culture, rather than solely that state’s international
standing or national security interests, impact the level of consistency between domestic and
international law.
To test this relationship my research design includes three variables (Figure 1). The
independent variable for this study is international law and norms. Because this project looks at
privacy law applicable to both France and the United States I look to international law applicable
to both countries, more specifically, resolutions and reports originating from the United Nations.
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This variable is derived from three different texts, as noted in Chapter One: Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, which recognizes a right to privacy as a
human right,2 the United Nations’ resolution on December 18, 2013, which recognized the need
for a specified “right to privacy in the digital age,3 and the United Nations resolution on
November 25, 2014, which created greater legal protection for this right to privacy.”4 My
dependent variable is domestic law, which I will study through French and American appellate
court decisions focusing on privacy issues related to technology. I chose to analyze court
decisions because I argue judicial decisions better reflect changes in a more politically neutral
application of political culture to legal questions than legislation would, as the legislative branch,
affected by the electoral process, is more vulnerable to varying political influences. Court
decisions, being in theory more insulated from current politics, weigh current law and legal
principles in the context of the greater constitutional and cultural values on which the country
was built in order to address current legal questions.
Figure 1: Research Design
Independent Variable

Dependent Variable

International
Law/Norms

Domestic Court
Decisions

Conditional Variable

Political
Culture

To clearly study how the relationship between international and domestic law is affected
by culture, my research design includes political culture as a conditional variable. While
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‘political culture’ has been defined and interpreted in numerous ways depending on the purpose
of the study, I largely base my conditional variable on the definition by Sidney Verba, who, in
the 1960s, was one of the early scholars to analyze political culture as a political science
phenomenon. Verba argues that political culture does not refer to the specific political
institutions within a state, but rather “a system of beliefs about political interaction and political
institutions.”5 Several decades later, in further defining a theory of political culture, Gabriel
Almond expands on the ideas of scholars such as Verba to create four ways in which the theory
can explain political culture, two of which are relevant to my own study. First, “political culture
has cognitive, effective and evaluative components... [in other words] it includes knowledge and
beliefs about political reality, feelings with respect to politics and commitments to political
values.”6 This explanation bears some resemblance to Verba’s definition as it relates to the
factors encompassing political culture. Second, Almond discusses the ramifications of political
culture, noting, “political culture affects political and governmental structure and performance; it
constraints it, but surely does not determine. The causal arrows between culture and structure and
performance go both ways.”7 Political culture is thus not only a descriptive factor in political
science, but can also influence political outcomes. Using political culture as a conditional
variable in my study as a means to understand different domestic laws is pursuant of these
conclusions.
To more specifically conceptualize political culture in the context of my research
question, I draw from the works of Verba and Almond to define political culture as the
foundational legal doctrines or the constitutions from which a state is governed. This follows the
two general definitions of political culture forwarded by Verba and Almond: the structure of the
political system and how citizens perceive and interact with this system. A constitution follows
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the first definition because it determines the entire structure of the government within a state. It
also reflects societal perceptions of the government because a constitution, at least within the two
countries I am analyzing, is created by representatives from the society that it governs. While
this definition of political culture is not necessarily broad enough to be applicable to all research,
it does apply the general definitions within political science scholarship in a manner that is
relevant to a legally based study. To choose the documents, I look to the current constitution
within each state, as well as the primary document identifying human rights. For the United
States I will use the U.S. Constitution, written in 1789, and the Bill of Rights, written in 1791.8
In France I study The Declaration of the Rights of Man, which was written in 1789 and acts as
the Preamble to the first constitution, written in 1791, and the current constitution, which was
written in 1958.9 Although France’s constitution is the French Republic’s fifth constitution, and
thus more recently written than the U.S. Constitution, the use of both French documents will
illustrate both the core foundational principles of the French Republic, as well as the current
political structure. To analyze the political culture within each state, I look to the nature of each
document (when it was written, the context for its creation) as well as the relevant philosophical
and theoretical influences on each, as this second consideration highlight which ideologies were
held to be culturally significant at the time of the document’s creation.
To operationalize the dependent variable, I use judicial decisions from each country’s
highest federal courts which have applied privacy law to legal questions related to technology.
Because this project seeks to analyze the effects of a conditional variable, political culture, I
sought to keep the dependent variable as consistent as possible for the two cases. Therefore, I
looked at a narrow class of privacy cases, specifically those related to possible infringements of
privacy as a result of more technologically advanced methods of surveillance, such as
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wiretapping and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) tracking. I also include cases in which more
advanced technology increases the scope of police search or seizure, for example the search of
cell phones and laptop computers.
To search for cases I use the case law database on LexisNexis® Academic for U.S. cases,
and Legifrance and Juricaf, two online French case law databases, for French cases. I search for
terms such as “privacy” and “technology”, or in the case of the French databases, “la vie privée”
and “technologie”. In order to prevent significant lurking variables, such as the influence of nowobsolete legal principles and outdated technology, I created temporal boundaries for my case
selection. However, I could not create too rigid of temporal bounds because questions related to
privacy and technology do not reach the supreme courts of both countries too frequently. It was
thus necessary to have a somewhat broader timeframe in order to have a sufficient number of
cases to analyze and I limited my cases to those occurring in the past thirty years. Although thirty
years still allows for the possibility of lurking variables it strikes a balance between decreasing
this possibility while also allowing for a more in-depth analysis of privacy concerns surrounding
technology. I made one exception to this rule, allowing one U.S. case from 1967 because it acted
as such a landmark case for judicial recognition of privacy in relation to new technology. For the
United States I analyze the following four Supreme Court cases: Katz v. United States (1967),
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001), United States v. Jones (2011), and Riley v. California (2014). The
four cases from the French Court of Cassation, which are named numerically, are: 86-90297
(1987), 10-11777 (2011), 11-84308 (2011), and 12-82391 (2014).
To measure the dependent variable, I use a standard set of questions for each case, as this
method ensures more standardized results while also allowing room for legal interpretation. The
method therefore acts as somewhat of a hybrid between more abstract comparative legal analysis
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and more concrete content analysis, as each method has its advantages and disadvantages. In
their comprehensive study of content analysis of judicial decisions Mark Hall and Ronald Wright
highlight that content analysis is ideal when each case is equally influential, and when
determining the outcome of cases, or the specific legal principles used.10 By looking only at
these superficial aspects of a case, researchers can boost the internal validity of their study
through the use of coding to decrease bias. However, failing to look at why outcomes are decided
can decrease the external validity of the study.11 Hall and Wright therefore note that content
analysis can be a useful tool for augmenting traditional legal analysis, especially in descriptive
legal studies.12 Because I want to determine a standardized set of data about court decisions, but
also understand the general reasoning behind these decisions, a mix of content analysis and
general legal analysis was the best method. To strike the balance between these methods I
developed a standard series of questions for reading each case (Figures 2).

Figure 2: Questions Guiding the Reading of Privacy Cases
1. What was the constitutional question reviewed by the Court?
2. What was the outcome of the case? Did the Court rule in favor of protecting
privacy or against it?
3. What tests and/or legal principles did the Court use?
4. Did the Court cite any preceding cases from this study; if so, did they expand on
or move away from the previous holding?
5. What elements of political culture are evident in the Court’s decision?
6. Did the Court cite any international laws or international courts?

These questions provide a standardized view of the cases that will simplify the process of
comparing cases from two different legal systems. Furthermore, using this set of questions rather
than pure content analysis provides a more comprehensive understanding of exactly how the
Court is interpreting privacy as a constitutional issue.
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Upon completing my examination of the conditional and dependent variables in Chapters
Four through Six, I delve into an analysis of the researched variables in full. In other words, I
examine what patterns exist in relation to privacy protections and recognitions in domestic court
decisions, as well as the extent to which these protections are consistent with international
norms. Although there are many facets of international norms, I use international laws from the
United Nations as representative of what is held to be normal within the international community
in relation to privacy law. Thus, in the context of my independent variable, international law and
international norms become generally interchangeable. To measure this variable I draw from the
three sources of international privacy law discussed in Chapter One: Article 12 of the UDHR, the
U.N. report from June 30, 2014 on “the right to privacy in the digital age,” and finally the
follow-up report from November 2014 further detailing the extent to which countries must
protect privacy. From this analysis, I can fully test my hypothesis by determining to what degree
differences in political culture account for inconsistencies between international and domestic
privacy law in France and the United States. Although I cannot prove a causal relationship
between political culture and the manner in which international norms are internalized, I am able
to deduce correlations between political culture and the inconsistencies between domestic and
international law.

Résumé de la methodologie
Dans ce projet, j’étudie comment la culture politique influence le niveau de cohérence
entre le droit international et les lois nationales. Autrement dit, j’analyse comment la culture
politique affecte le rapport entre le droit international et le droit national. Le design de recherche
pour ce projet utilise trois variables. Ma variable indépendante est les normes internationales de
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la vie privée. Pour déterminer ce que la communauté internationale considère comment la norme,
j’utilise le droit international, plus spécifiquement les résolutions passées par les Nations Unies
concernant la vie privée. Ma variable dépendante est les lois nationales. Puisqu’il existe plusieurs
types de loi, j’étudie les décisions judiciaires à la place des lois passées par les législatures. Avec
les décisions judiciaires je peux voir comment les interprétations de la vie privée évoluent et
répondent à la nouvelle technologie. Pour examiner cette variable, j’utilise les cas de la Cour
Suprême des Etats-Unis et la Cour de Cassation en France. Pour chaque pays j’analyse quatre cas
judiciaires qui concernent l’applications des standards nationaux de la vie privée sur les
technologiques spécifiques, par exemple, les écoutes téléphoniques, le pistage avec GPS, et le
recherche des portables.
Ma variable conditionnelle est la culture politique. Comme les études des politologues
suggèrent, plusieurs définitions de la culture politique existent. Mais, pour la culture politique au
contexte de ce projet, la définition appropriée est la suivante : la fondation du système judiciaire,
y compris les constitutions ou les autres doctrines qui créent le fond de la compréhension
sociétale des concepts légaux. En étudiant la culture politique, ou plus spécifiquement ces
fondations, on se tourne aux caractéristiques du pays comme le rôle du gouvernement, les droits
donnés aux hommes et aux femmes, et comment les cours fédérales sont structurées. Pour les
Etats-Unis, j’analyse la Constitution et la Déclaration de Droits, et pour la France j’étudie la
Constitution de la Ve République et la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen. À part
de considérer comment ces documents reflètent les structures et les rôles des branches
judiciaires, j’examine aussi les idéologies populaires avec les auteurs des documents pour que je
puisse mieux comprendre leurs implications culturelles.

41
Donc, je peux comparer non seulement comment les connaissances de la vie privée
évoluent dans les deux pays mais aussi comment les deux pays appliquent différemment les
normes de la vie privée aux même questions légales. La méthode générale employée dans cette
étude est une analyse comparative de droit. Pour mieux mesurer et comparer les cas judiciaires,
j’utilise une série standardisée de questions s’appliqueront à chaque cas (Figure 3). Ces questions
seront liées aux principes légales sur la vie privée, aux concepts courants au niveau international
sur le sujet, et à la culture politique. Cette série de questions donne plus de validité interne à
l’étude parce qu’il y a des informations uniformes pour chaque cas. En mesurant la variable
conditionnelle, la culture politique, j’utilise un type similaire d’analyse comparative pour
examiner les constitutions de chaque état. Cependant, cette analyse de la variable conditionnelle
sera avant l’analyse des cas juridiques pour que je puisse faire référence aux aspects spécifiques
de culture politique pendant l’analyse des cas. Enfin, avec ces informations, j’analyse comment
la culture politique se présente aux décisions juridiques, comment c’est différente entre les deux
pays, et comment ces différences peuvent expliquer les incohérences entre les lois nationales et
le droit international par rapport à la vie privée.

Figure 3: Questions pour les cas judiciaires sur la vie privée
1. Quelle est la question constitutionnelle revue par la Cour ?
2. Quel est le résultat du cas ? Est-ce que la Cour a prononcé un jugement
favorable ou opposé à la vie privée?
3. Auxquels tests ou principes légaux la Cour a-t-elle recours ?
4. La Cour cite-t-elle les cas précédents signifiants ; si oui, augmente ou a
diminue les protections de la vie privée ?
5. Quels éléments de la culture politique sont évidents dans la décision ?
6. La Cour cite-t-elle des lois internationales ou des décisions des cours
internationales ?
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Chapter 4: An Analysis of Political Culture
Introduction
This study seeks to push beyond describing how international law may be internalized
differently in states, to why international law is internalized differently. More specifically it will
examine how political culture can influence this process by acting as a conditional variable on
the relationship between international and national law. This chapter will establish an
understanding of political culture in both the United States and France, as well as address how
this political understanding may relate to an understanding of privacy. As noted in Chapter
Three, political culture has been defined and studied in a myriad of ways depending on the focus
of the project. Because this study seeks to understand how political culture affects judicial
understandings of privacy, I turn to an analysis of political culture related to the principles and
philosophical ideas on which the country was built. Although this is only one aspect of culture,
this philosophical and historical approach highlights the cultural understandings of government,
of the citizen, and of the relationship between the two, as well as how these understandings have
permeated a culture’s political system and created a unique understanding of legal questions,
such as those related to privacy. This historical angle is needed because, as Bernhard Grossfeld
argues in his assessment of comparative law, “often the best explanation of a legal institution lies
in its history rather than in its current operation.”1 Therefore, to fully understand a country’s
unique cultural understanding of the role of its legal and political institutions, it is necessary to
study the philosophical and theoretical concepts that influenced and inspired the creation of these
institutions.
To gain this historical and philosophical understanding of political culture, I analyze the
founding documents from each country; including their constitutions and their declaration of
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rights. An analysis of these documents is an effective method for understanding first, the general
principles on which each country was founded and structured, and second, the nuanced
philosophical undertones that make each system unique. For the United States, I analyze the
Constitution of the United States, including the Bill of Rights; for France, I analyze both the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (La Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et
du Citoyen) and the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the current governing constitution. By
studying the Bill of Rights separately from the U.S. Constitution, the analysis of U.S. documents
can mirror that of the French documents, where the citizens’ rights were recorded in a separate
document. This also recognizes that Bill of Rights, although now considered a part of the U.S.
Constitution, was written two years after the Constitution was adopted. Aside from studying the
documents themselves, I also use secondary sources, specifically the works of scholars who
specialize in the philosophical and theoretical influences present during these eras. Drawing from
these sources will provide a more nuanced understanding of the cultural implications of each
document. In each document, I look first to the context in which it was written, for example, who
wrote it, why it was created, and most importantly the political and philosophical theories that
inspired its core ideas. I then turn to a discussion of the actual content of the document as
relevant to my study, looking at how the structure of the government system or recognition of
protected rights provides insight into the political culture of the country.

United States
The Constitution of the United States
The Constitution of the United States was written in 1787 by an assembly of state
delegates seeking to respond to the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation, the previous
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governing document.2 Before delving into the contents of the Constitution, it is first necessary to
understand the context of its creation. After declaring independence from Britain, the colonies
that later became the United States had the difficult task of structuring a new government. In
their book on the origins and development of the Constitution, Alfred Kelly, Winifred Harbison
and Herman Belz highlight the significance of republicanism in the political order at the time.
Republicanism, or the theory that the government should be a public matter with an emphasis on
the well-being of society over the well-being of a specific group, was a new but prevailing theory
during the colonial and revolutionary era.3 Aside from being accepted as option for Americans
previously under the rule of a monarch across the Atlantic, a republican government was also a
logical step. The United States lacked a titled aristocracy, such as those existing in many
European countries. Thus, without the British crown, “the popular element [was] the only basis
of government.”4 Although republicanism was popular, it was not the prevailing theory behind
the Articles of Confederation, which created a “confederal union” of states, each of which had its
own Constitution.5 Under this system, each state was recognized as its own sovereign entity,
while the central motivation behind having a single “United States” was a need for a unified
defense against potential aggression from Britain and other external threats.6 Constitutional law
scholars Kelly, Harbison, and Belz argue that it was a lack of republicanism, and not a lack of
responsibility at the national level, as commonly believed, that created the weaknesses of the
Articles of Confederation and inspired the creation of the Constitution.7
Before analyzing the effects of republicanism, and other influential theories, on the
Constitution itself, I would first like to examine the dominant theories of this period and how
they became a part of the founding fathers’ political foundations. To understand this context for
framing of the Constitution, David Bederman turns to a brief analysis of higher education in the
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United States during the eighteenth century, as the subjects and authors studied at college often
represent the general influences on the elite, who then affect the population as a whole.
Bederman notes that the main universities in the colonies, those attended by the founding fathers,
focused heavily on the classics, particularly Greek and Roman philosophy. Many Framers
“regarded the classical tradition as granting useful knowledge and valuable historic precedent on
what John Adams called ‘the divine science of politics.’”8
It was from the study of the success of the Greeks and Romans, two famous republican
powers, that led Adams to ultimately embrace republicanism.9 In learning about former
governments who followed this doctrine, the founding fathers were also able to learn from some
of the shortcomings of those political systems. For example, Adams noticed that a downfall for
Rome was the lack of separation between the executive, judicial and legislative branches, and the
exact responsibilities of each was never sufficiently defined. The Romans assumed that having a
“mixed government” with representation from all groups would act as a method of checks and
balances, an assumption that unfortunately often led to an abuse of power.10 Therefore not only
did the classics provide a theoretical and philosophical foundation for the key political actors in
American, but they also provided opportunities to learn from the successes and failures of similar
governments. This historical perspective gave the Framers of the Constitution the ability to more
effectively and successfully apply classical philosophy to a new political system.
Aside from the classics themselves, the founding fathers often cited several secondary
writers on the classics. Montesquieu, for example, was a popular influence as his 1748 work,
L’Esprit des lois (The Spirit of the Laws) was one of the most referenced works on the classics
cited by the Framers.11 Montesquieu was primarily a republican, and The Spirit of Laws details
the several ways in which republics may effectively govern.12 However, in discussing this legal
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system, Montesquieu brought up one of the central problems facing the Framers: republics are
often geographically small, thus there was the question of whether this model would even be
attainable for the United States.13 The Framers also turned to Montesquieu’s model of a
“Confederate Republic”, which is based on the theory that there is a net benefit from creating a
confederacy out of small, previously independent states. A union of states increases the ability of
the states to respond to internal and external threats, without losing the benefits of a small, more
localized government.14 Through this model, the Framers could use a federalist approach to
apply the advantages of a republican government on a larger scale. These works, whether
classical or works building off of classical works, demonstrate a central political ideology at the
time of the American Revolution. The Framers were primarily supporters of creating a republic,
while also drawing from Montesquieu’s logic on federalism, as a means of applying
republicanism to a larger geographical area.
However, it is important to note the difference between republicanism and democracy in
this context, as many of the founding fathers were in support of a republic but staunchly opposed
to creating a democracy. At the time of the framing of the Constitution, democracies were widely
regarded as short-lived and unsuccessful, or as James Madison opined: “Democracies have been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal
security, or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as they have
been violent in their deaths.”15 What, then, is the major difference between a republic and a
democracy, at least in relation to how the terms were employed at the end of the eighteenth
century? At the most basic level, democracies were considered governments ruled by the people,
whereas republics were considered governments comprised of representatives for the people.
Although republics could be less reflective of actual popular opinion on certain topics, they had
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the advantage of providing greater stability.16 During Thomas Jefferson’s presidency the United
States moved closer toward democracy, as he was a greater supporter of democratic principles;
however, the Constitution was still based on republican, not democratic theory.17
With this theoretical foundation, I turn now to the Constitution itself. The document is
comprised of seven articles, plus a preamble and the Bill of Rights.18 The central articles outline
the powers of each branch of government, detailing a system of careful checks and balances that
incorporates some of Adams’ concerns regarding the failures of the Roman checks and balances
systems. Of these central articles, the most relevant to this study are Articles III and IV which
detail the power of the judiciary and the relationship between federal and state governments
respectively. Most notable of Article III is Section 1, which creates one Supreme Court, and
recognizes the ability of the Congress to establish inferior courts as necessary. Section 2 touches
on the jurisdiction of the judicial branch, such as the types of cases the judicial power has the
authority to rule on and when the Supreme Court is given original or appellate jurisdiction.
However, it is important note Sanford Levinson’s observation that nowhere in the Constitution
are the courts explicitly given judicial review.19 In comparison with the executive and legislative
branches, the judicial branch is given little explicit constitutional power. Instead, much of the
judicial branch’s power comes from the Judiciary Act of 1789. Although this Act is, of course,
separate from the Constitution itself, it is still worth noting because it used the power given to
Congress by Article III to establish actual courts from abstract constitutional concepts. It is from
this Act that the powers given to the judicial branch went from abstract notions to tangible
duties, and an actual Supreme Court was created.20
Although Article IV relates less directly to the functions of the judiciary, it is an
important article for understanding how the political theories previously mentioned actually
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became a part of the Constitution, and therefore a part of American political culture. Most
notable in Article IV is Section 4, which reads: “The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened), against domestic Violence.”21 This section reflects two important aspects of the
prevailing political views at the end of the eighteenth century. First, it specifically designates a
republican form of government, not a democracy.22 Second, the recognition of both state
government and the federal government’s duty to protect its states also follows Montesquieu’s
theories surrounding federalism. Although exact language for these concepts may have evolved
over time, for instance the evolution of the terms ‘republican’ and ‘democratic’, these theories
remain a part of the Constitution and therefore a part of the United States’ political culture.
It is also worth noting in relation to the Constitution, how the Framers’ experience with
legal systems influenced the role of the courts in the United States. As a former British colony,
the newly formed United States adopted the standards of English common law. Common law is
best understood as “judge-made law”, where the courts have the ability to extend or limit law
through the use of precedent. Therefore, to understand law required not only understanding the
original written code, but also the judicial interpretations of the law.23 As such, any written laws,
and therefore the Constitution, act as dynamic legal documents with the capacity to evolve
through interpretation and application.

The Bill of Rights
Because the Bill of Rights was written two years after the Constitution, it draws from
many of the same philosophical and political theories. However, it is important to note why the
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Bill of Rights came into existence. Garrett Epps, a law professor at The University of Oregon,
argues that the Framers were, “far more concerned with making sure that the government had
enough power to survive than with ensuring that it recognized the rights of the people.”24 The
need to recognize individual rights and protect them from government intrusion was a secondary
consideration, primarily led by James Madison. Madison initially proposed twelve amendments,
although only ten were actually ratified. Former Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell articulates
the significance of the amendments formally ratified as a part of the Bill of Rights. These ten
amendments are based on the limitation of federal power, not state power. Madison’s
amendment applying these rights as protections from the states was never ratified; it was only in
later judicial considerations that the Supreme Court held the Bill of Rights protected citizens
from local government.25 This represents the importance, at least initially, of state autonomy and
stability over the protection of the individual, thus reflecting some of the core tenets of
republicanism and federalism. In other words, the ability of the states to make decisions within
their own borders took precedent over the universal protection of individual liberties.
In turning to the actual content of the Bill of Rights, Epps notes three important
characteristics. First, the document primarily recognizes negative liberties, a term used by
twelfth-century philosopher Isaiah Berlin to describe protection from certain government
action.26 For example, the First Amendment protects citizens from government infringement on
their freedom of speech, of the press, and to practice their religion, the Fourth Amendment
protects citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” the Eighth Amendment protects
citizens from “cruel and unusual punishments.”27 This is in contrast to positive rights or liberties,
or the right to be provided a liberty or service by the government.28 Second, the concept of
equality appears nowhere within the original ten amendments. As a result, Epps argues that the

51
Bill of Rights acted as, “a set of limitations on the government of a republic that permitted vast
inequality on the basis of class, sex and race.”29 These inequalities did not begin to be addressed
until 1868, with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, Epps highlights the
vagueness and indeterminate nature of much of the language within the amendments, therefore
leaving the Bill of Rights open to great debate and interpretation. For example, he notes that the
Fifth Amendment discusses “due process of law,” the Sixth a “speedy” trial, as well as other
similarly vague terms in other amendments that are not explicitly defined.30 This vagueness is a
significant consideration when looking at political culture, especially in my next chapter when I
begin to analyze how political culture is reflected in recent judicial interpretations of privacy.
There must be a distinction made between current understandings of these amendments, and the
actual original language. By showing the evolution of these concepts, it will be possible to
understand the cultural implications of judicial decisions.
In analyzing the Bill of Rights, it is also worth noting that the concept of privacy is never
mentioned. Rather than detail a positive right to privacy, the Bill of Rights instead provides
certain negative rights that have been interpreted to also provide an implicit right to privacy. For
example, the Fourth Amendment recognizes that “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”31
Read literally, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures, thus securing a negative right from government intrusion into one’s private affairs.
Although it does not explicitly address a right to privacy, it does provide an implicit recognition
of private affairs, whether it be one’s own private home or papers and effects. It is this implicit
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right to privacy that the Supreme Court later recognized in cases such as Katz v. United States,
and has continued to apply to privacy and technology issues since that landmark cases.32 It is
therefore, this aspect of the Bill of Rights that will be particularly relevant for my study.

Conclusion
With this overview of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the question then becomes,
what do these documents highlight in terms of political culture, particularly political culture as
relevant to privacy concerns? A reflection upon the political and philosophical influences,
primarily the classics, on the founding fathers demonstrates the role of republican and federal
theories in framing the Constitution. In applying these theories to the Constitution, the Framers
sought to create a republic that struck a balance between political stability and the fair
representation of the people. Through a federalist approach, the Framers could also find a
balance between the advantages of a central government, while also retaining a level of state
autonomy. This autonomy is particularly visible in the Bill of Rights, and the lack of constriction
on state action that it initially allowed. The Bill of Rights also reflects a focus on negative rights,
or a protection from government intrusion. However, as noted above, many of these rights were
vaguely construed using terms that were never explicitly defined. This vagueness leaves the Bill
of Rights open to judicial interpretation, as the Supreme Court acts upon the powers given by
both Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789. Overall, both the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights represent a concern about federal intrusion, whether on the autonomy of the states or the
personal liberties of the individual.
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France
Nous nous tournons maintenant à une recherche de la culture politique en France, avec
l’étude des deux documents gouvernementaux qui sont centraux au pays français. Dans un
premier temps, nous analysons la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, qui a été
passée en 1789 et donc précède la constitution actuelle en France, qui a été passée en 1958.
Puisque ce premier document était un des premiers résultats concrets de la Révolution française
et représente les changements de mentalités pendant la Révolution, il est nécessaire de discuter
les influences politiques et philosophiques sur cette période historique de la nation française
avant de commencer l’analyse du document soi-même. Puis, dans un deuxième temps nous
analysons la Constitution de la Ve République pour comprendre comment ces influences
politiques ont évolué et sont reflétées dans la constitution actuelle.

La Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen
Il reste un grand débat sur les influences principales pendant la Révolution : quels
penseurs étaient signifiants, comment leurs idées étaient utilisées, et à quel point ils ont influencé
les révolutionnaires. Cependant, il y a deux penseurs de cette période qui sont reconnus comme
des influences signifiantes : Montesquieu et Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Comme nous l’avons
mentionné dans la partie précédente, Montesquieu a proposé plusieurs études nouvelles de la
politique dans son œuvre De l’esprit des lois, publiée pour la première fois en 1748. Dans cette
œuvre, Montesquieu définit deux idées principales qui ont été utilisées pendant la Révolution
française. Premièrement, il réaffirme sa reconnaissance des lois naturelles qui existent comme les
libertés universelles des individus mais aussi les privilèges des certains, une idée qui vient des
théoriciens classiques. Il affirme que « le monde intelligent soit aussi bien gouverné que le
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monde physique, » ainsi il y a « aussi des lois qui par leur nature sont invariables. »33 Une de ces
lois naturelles est « le désir de vivre en société. »34 Alors, Montesquieu décrit comment les
hommes ont utilisé les lois naturelles pour créer une société basée sur les lois positives. Il y a,
selon lui, trois types de droit qui gouvernent les états. D’abord, le droit des gens dicte comment
les membres des états doivent interagir. Ensuite, le droit politique impose des règles sur le
gouvernement de chaque état, et protège ainsi le rapport entre les citoyens et l’état. Enfin, le droit
civil régit « le rapport que tous les citoyens ont entre eux. »35 Par conséquent, les lois naturelles
influencent la création des tous les types de droit, qui sont compris comment les systèmes des
lois, positifs.
De ce fait, ses idées sur le droit naturel et ses observations des systèmes différents font
avancer aussi une nouvelle compréhension de l’intersection entre le droit positif et le droit
naturel. Plus spécifiquement, il voit les deux types de droit comme moins divisés que l’on ne l’a
pensé.36 Les lois naturelles créent la base de tous les types de droit qui gouvernent les hommes,
mais elles seules créent des systèmes de droit différents à cause des cultures différentes, et donc
les interprétations variées. Même si on tente d’appliquer les lois naturelles, et donc les concepts
de la justice universelle, on peut avoir encore des lois défectueuses. Les lois sont toujours
influencées par les conditions et les besoins de la société qu’il gouverne et par la volonté variée
des individus qui le créent. Pour s’adapter à cette questions, on doit ajuster les lois aux
conditions uniques de la société pour que les principes universelles de la justice puissent exister
et protéger les libertés des individus.37
Cette reconnaissance du gouvernement unique qui est nécessaire pour l’avancement des
lois naturelles mène au deuxième concept principal de Montesquieu dans son œuvre, l’idée de la
séparation des pouvoirs. Pendant ces études des systèmes légaux différents il et donc les
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distributions des pouvoirs qui sont les plus effectives.38 L’importance de la séparation des
pouvoirs est une idée bien discutée dans la partie de notre étude sur la culture américaine, mais il
faut revisiter le contexte des libertés individuelles, et puis de la Révolution française en générale.
Montesquieu reconnaît l’importance des droits de l’individu et soutient un système de pouvoir
bien équilibré parce qu’il peut mieux protéger ces libertés.39 La séparation des pouvoirs fournit
aussi une stabilité pour le gouvernement sans créer le despotisme, un concept qu’il continue à
condamner.40 Montesquieu pense que la politique et l’exercice raisonnable du pouvoir sont « le
lieu de compromis entre les intérêts des individus et le fait de la société. »41 Dans ce sens, il
représente un modèle de libéralisme plus modéré, l’équilibre entre la stabilité gouvernementale
et la protection des libertés individuelles.
Montesquieu propose, certainement, de nouveaux concepts de droit et de gouvernement
dans De l’esprit des lois, mais le plus grand problème est que son œuvre était principalement une
étude sur les systèmes de droit. Il détaille les problèmes qu’il voit et les théories très générales
qu’il croit être les plus efficaces mais il ne donne pas de recommandation concrète qui peuvent
être utilisé par les révolutionnaires.42 Dans ce sens, Montesquieu fournit une connaissance des
systèmes de droit différents et questionne les formes de gouvernement nouvelles. Cette
perspective est intéressante parce qu’il peut expliquer comment les idées de Montesquieu ont été
utilisées des façons très différents par plusieurs parties pendant la Révolution. Pour les
révolutionnaires, les idées de Montesquieu ont été complétées par les théories des autres
penseurs célèbres de cette période; une des ces influences politiques, et peut être l’influence la
plus notable, est Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Rousseau était une influence célèbre principalement à cause de son œuvre Du Contrat
Social, publié en 1762. Comme avec des autres théoriciens, les spécialistes de l’histoire de la
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Révolution ne sont pas d’accord à l’égard d’influence exacte de Rousseau, mais c’est presque
universellement accepté qu’il a été une influence très signifiante. Roger Barny, par exemple,
soutient que Rousseau était une plus grande influence que Montesquieu, en disant que « la
‘bible’ des révolutionnaires, dès le début, ce n’est pas l’Esprit des lois, mais le Contrat
social. »43 Du Contrat Social affirme des notions d’une société égale et démocratique qui
deviennent des piliers des théories des révolutionnaires française.44 Mais qu’est-ce que c’est,
cette idée de rousseauisme qui était souvent citée pendant la Révolution ? En général, Rousseau
propose qu’il y a un ordre social qui « est un droit sacré qui sert de base à tous les autres. »45
Dans ce sens, la société doit être réglée comme une association des individus. S’il y a trop de
pouvoir au chef du gouvernement qui traitent les citoyens comme des esclaves dépourvues des
libertés individuelles, ce n’est plus un gouvernement légitime.
En bref, Rousseau reconnaît la différence « entre soumettre une multitude et régir une
société. »46 C’est la responsabilité de la société de s’assurer que le gouvernement aussi que les
autres membres de la société demeurent le contrat social.47 Cependant, il y a un compromis entre
la protection de l’ordre social et les libertés individuelles qui sont indépendantes des autres.
Rousseau affirme que, « c’est qu’au lieu de détruire l’égalité naturelle, le pacte fondamental
substitue au contraire une égalité morale et légitime à ce que la nature avait pu mettre d’inégalité
physique entre les hommes, et que, pouvant être inégaux en force ou en génie, ils deviennent
tous égaux par convention et de droit. »48 L’ordre social qu’il propose crée l’égalité entre tous les
hommes par un gouvernement qui s’agit comme une association volontaire des citoyens.
En outre, un autre aspect Du contrat social qui est important pour la Révolution était le
concept du moralisme, lié aux libertés naturelles et civiles. Rousseau souligne l’importance des
libertés comme une partie nécessaire de l’humanité parce que, « c’est ôter toute moralité à ses
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actions que d’ôter toute liberté à sa volonté. »49 S’il ne reconnaîtrait pas d’autonomie de
l’individu et le concept de la volonté générale, le gouvernement perdrait sa légitimité.50 Pour
Rousseau, l’étude de l’histoire et des systèmes de gouvernance doit inclure la considération de la
moralité, spécifiquement quand on étudie la situation des hommes. Cette perspective a influencé
certains révolutionnaires de placer « cette exigence morale… au cœur de la politique. »51 Ce
moralisme peut expliquer aussi l’importance de la reconnaissance des droits de l’homme avant la
création d’un gouvernement structuré ; la moralité exige la justice, car, sans la justice, le
gouvernement n’a plus de pouvoir légitime.
Rousseau, quand on le compare à Montesquieu, a une perspective politique plus libérale,
et pour l’époque, presque radicale. Il prend certaines des mêmes idées de Montesquieu
concernant les lois naturelles, et donc les libertés naturelles, mais il les utilise pour proposer une
nouvelle connaissance du gouvernement. Tandis que Montesquieu garde un peu la structure du
gouvernement, et donc l’influence aristocratique de laquelle il profite, Rousseau décrit un
gouvernement plus interdépendant et général. Par conséquent, le rousseauisme conteste l’idée
française de l’aristocratie, un aspect culturelle qui était une tradition importante dans l’histoire
gouvernementale de la France. Un rejet de cette structure gouvernement était ainsi radical pour
l’époque.
Mais pourquoi ces perspectives sont-elles importantes pour la création de la Déclaration
des droit de l’homme et du citoyen ? D’abord on doit considérer le contexte de cette création. La
Déclaration ne reconnaît pas simplement des libertés individuelles, elle marque le premier pas
dans le processus de constitutionnalisation, le changement complet et idéologique du
gouvernement français. La reconnaissance des lois naturelles est particulièrement importante
pour cette raison. La Révolution française renverse tout l’ordre social et politique et les
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révolutionnaires avaient besoin de logique pour ce rejet. Avec un appel aux droits naturels, les
révolutionnaires pouvaient justifier l’abondamment d’un système de gouvernance considéré
d’être tyrannique parce qu’ils cherchaient à rétablir l’ordre naturel et les droits universels des
citoyens.52 Les théories de Montesquieu et de Rousseau concernant le droit naturel, et les libertés
universelles qu’il protège, donnent la légitimité à la cause révolutionnaire française.
À part de contexte de la création de la Déclaration, les théories philosophiques de cette
période sont aussi évidentes dans les droits protégés par la déclaration. Même le préambule
désigne les articles suivants comme « les droits naturels, inaliénables et sacrés de l'Homme. »53
Similairement, Article 1er affirme que « les hommes naissent de demeurent libres et égaux en
droits, » un des concepts principaux de l’idée rousseauiste des droits universels.54 Ce qui est
aussi important dans l’analyse de ce document est la reconnaissance des droits du pays, l’idée de
la souveraineté, et donc le rapport entre l’État et le citoyen.55 Ce document reconnaît les droits
des individus, mais il reconnaît aussi ceux des citoyens. Article 15, par exemple, constate, « La
Société a le droit de demander compte à tout Agent public de son administration. »56 Cette
distinction représente l’importance culturelle pendant la Révolution d’avoir des libertés
individuelles protégées mais aussi une société bien cohésive qui peut se défendre face à un
gouvernement trop restrictif ou oppressif. Le concept de la vie privée, comme détaillé dans cette
déclaration, reflète aussi cette équilibre entre l’individu et la société. Article 17 constate que « la
propriété étant un droit inviolable et sacré, nul ne peut en être privé, si ce n'est lorsque la
nécessité publique, légalement constatée, l'exige évidemment, et sous la condition d'une juste et
préalable indemnité. »57 Cette reconnaissance est limitée à la propriété privée, mais elle note
quand même que l’individu à le droit d’une vie loin de la domaine publique. Mais, en même
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temps, ce droit n’est pas absolu et l’article souligne que ce droit peut être surpassé s’il y a assez
de besoin commun.
La Constitution de la Ve République
L’histoire gouvernementale française depuis la Révolution est un peu plus compliquée
que l’histoire américaine, principalement parce que la France est maintenant sur sa cinquième
république, et donc sa cinquième constitution. L’étude de cette constitution actuelle est logique
parce qu’elle s’inspire toujours des idées fondamentales de la Révolution, surtout de celles qu’on
voit aussi dans la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, mais aussi des changements
culturels depuis le XVIIIe siècle. Pour que ce chapitre ne devienne pas une histoire considérable
de la France entre 1791 (l’année du premier document constitutionnel) et 1958 (l’année de
l’adoption de la constitution actuelle), je soulignerai seulement les changements les plus
importants pour une connaissance générale de la culture politique.
La Constitution de la Ve République (désormais appelée ‘la Constitution’) est
essentiellement le résultat des suggestions de Charles de Gaulle, devenu le premier président de
la Ve République. De Gaulle, avec le reste de la France, voit l’instabilité de la IV République
parce que le pouvoir donné aux « coalitions changeantes des groupes parlementaire, » est
imprévisible.58 La gouvernance était compliqué et les changements de régime passent souvent.
Avec la création d’une nouvelle république, et donc un nouveau structure du gouvernement, la
France cherche à créer plus de stabilité, particulièrement pour l’exécutif avec des mandats
présidentiels plus durables.59 L’accent sur le pouvoir présidentiel est la tentative de Charles de
Gaulle de protéger son poste s’il devient président.60 Ce changement représente aussi un
déplacement idéologique concernant l’équilibre que Montesquieu a cherché entre la stabilité du
régime et la protection des individus. Avec la Constitution de la Ve République, la France gagne
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plus de stabilité contre moins de surveillance sur l’exécutif. Mais, même de Gaulle veux
préserver cet équilibre et « respecter les principes et procédures démocratiques, » en mettant « la
soumission finale du texte constitutionnel à la ratification populaire. »61 La Constitution a été
promulguée en octobre 1958 et est comprise de quatre-vingt-neuf articles organisés en seize
titres, ou catégories.62
À part de ce changement fondamental de la structure de l’exécutif, comment le système
judiciaire est-il organisé sous la Constitution ? La Cour de Cassation, la cour d’appel la plus
haute en France, était déjà une partie du système judicaire, mais la Constitution de 1958 ajoute
aussi le Conseil Constitutionnel sous le Titre VII du document. Avec ce corps, la branche
judicaire prend deux responsabilités principales qui viennent des pouvoirs législatifs de la
république précédente.63 Premièrement, le Conseil supervise le processus électoral du président,
et quand nécessaire, celui des députés et des sénateurs, aussi que les ratifications.64
Deuxièmement, le Conseil détermine la constitutionnalité des lois faites par les assemblées avant
qu’ils soient entrées en application. Sous Article 62, « une disposition déclarée
inconstitutionnelle … ne peut être promulguée ni mise en application. »65 Avec la création du
Conseil Constitutionnel, le système judicaire prend la responsabilité pour une partie de la
surveillance sur l’exécutif, et aussi les corps législatifs. Autrement dit, l’équilibre des pouvoirs
est redistribué avec la nouvelle Constitution pour créer plus de stabilité, notamment certains
pouvoirs législatifs sont transférés à l’exécutif et au système judicaire. Ce système représente
l’importance des libertés des citoyens soutenue par Rousseau, avec la protection des valeurs de la
Constitution, mais au même temps, la séparation et l’équilibre des pouvoirs que Montesquieu a
détaillée.
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Conclusion
La Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, ainsi que la Constitution
de la Ve République, montrent l’importance de quelques aspects culturels de la Révolution
française qui restent signifiants pour la culture politique actuel. Premièrement, la séparation des
pouvoirs et les procédures de contrôles et de contrepoids restent importantes pour la protection
des individus. Mais, ces procédures ne existent pas seulement au niveau gouvernemental ; la
Déclaration reflète les idées rousseauistes concernant les responsabilité des citoyens, ou ils
s’agissent comme une communauté unifié pour se défendre contre l’oppression possible du
gouvernement. Deuxièmement, le droit naturel fournit le fond nécessaire pour la reconnaissance
des libertés universelles pour que la France peut être, au niveau gouvernemental, une société
d’égalité.

Comparison and Conclusion
There are several distinctions that can be made between the political culture of the United
States and that of France. Although both countries draw from similar influences, such as
Montesquieu, and political theories, such as republicanism, the outcomes were considerably
different. The United States came from colonial past, where the revolution provided the
opportunity for self-governance. After gaining independence, it was the first time that the states
were truly their own unified entity. Although Americans wanted to remain unified, there was still
a strong sense of state autonomy, as this was the system they were most used to. The result was
federal republic, where the states were unified for the sake of economic advantage and defense
from exterior threats. However, as recognized in both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the
states retained a certain degree of autonomy and individuality.
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This differs substantially from the outcome of the French Revolution, where the French
people were revolting against an oppressive, and to a certain degree despotic, monarchical rule.
The French people, like the Americans, wanted the opportunity to self-rule; however, they had a
unified history that the Americans did not. Because of the strong and historical sense of French
culture, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen emphasizes the unity of the
French people as one populace. Similarly, because France sought to distance itself from
oppressive rule, rather than distant colonial rule as was the case in the United States, there was a
careful separation of powers and system of checks and balances to ensure the protection of civil
liberties. Furthermore, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen details the role of
French society in governmental oversight, ensuring that each citizen remain connected with the
government of a country that once isolated its people.
The French political culture is therefore, compared to that of the United States, more
concerned about the internal threat of government oppression. Aside from the content of their
documents, this concern is also evident in the chronology of the documents. Although there may
certainly be numerous factors affecting this order it is certainly worth noting that in France, the
recognition of individual rights came before the official structuring of the government, whereas
in the United States, the Bill of Rights was created two years after the Constitution. In France,
the significance of certain universal liberties also reflects the influence of theories of natural law
when structuring the government. Although France recognizes the possibility of government
oppression, the balance between a universal society and individual rights means that certain
rights are not absolute. The right to private property, for example, is recognized in some form by
both the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Man; however, the French right more
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specifically details the ability of the government to infringe on this right when there is sufficient
societal need to do so.
A final consideration relates to the manner in which law is used in each country.
Although both countries have similar procedures from creating legislation, and thus codification,
the United States has a greater and more recent tie to English government; the influence of
English common law is therefore a major and distinguishable aspect of the American judicial
system. This is a particularly relevant difference when moving to the actual analysis of privacy
cases in Chapter 4. For United States cases, there will be a far greater emphasis on precedent and
how certain implicit understandings of privacy from the Bill of Rights have evolved and been
applied to recent technology cases. On the French side, however, it is the law actually being
applied that is of significance, and how these laws, as applied, reflect the evolution of the
understanding of privacy.
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Chapter 5: United States Privacy Case Law
Introduction
In Chapter 4 I explored some of the key aspects of American political culture related to
the republican structure of the government, the relationship between citizens and government as
regulated by the Bill of Rights, and the governmental recognition of privacy concerns. This
chapter takes these cultural understandings and analyzes how they are reflected in U.S. Supreme
Court decisions about the privacy implications of new technology. In this sense, this chapter
addresses a major aspect of my research question by reviewing how political culture is reflected
in privacy norms within the United States. To analyze the relationship between political culture
and privacy norms, I will analyze four United States Supreme Court decisions, each relating to a
slightly different question concerning privacy and technology. I review Katz v. United States
(1967) for investigative wiretapping, Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) for the publication of private
communications, United States v. Jones (2011) for vehicle tracking via global positioning system
(GPS) technology, and Riley v. California (2014) for searches of personal technology. While
reading each case I apply a standard set of eight questions (see Figure 1) in order to assure
consistency between readings.
Figure 1: Questions Guiding the Reading of U.S. Privacy Cases
7. What was the constitutional question reviewed by the Court?
8. What was the outcome of the case? Did the Court rule in favor of protecting
privacy or against it?
9. What tests and/or legal principles did the Court use?
10. Did the Court cite any significant preceding cases; if so, did they expand on
or move away from the previous holding?
11. What elements of political culture are evident in the Court’s decision?
12. Did the Court cite any international laws or international courts?
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Katz v. United States (1967)
In Katz v. United States (1967), the Court ruled on the constitutionality of an
investigation in which law enforcement collected evidence of an individual’s (hereafter, “the
petitioner”) gambling endeavors without acquiring a warrant. The Court held that wiretapping
constituted a search, and thus without a warrant infringed upon the Fourth Amendment
protections of the petitioner. The Court’s reasoning stemmed from the holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects people and not places. It is therefore insufficient to hold that an
unreasonable search did not occur simply because a physical trespass did not take place by law
enforcement. The Court, in referencing the previous case of Rios v. United States, reaffirmed that
what an individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”1 An individual, such as the petitioner in this case, may therefore
retain Fourth Amendment protections in public, so long as he seeks to preserve the information
as private. The Court held that the petitioner had done so and therefore government action
infringed upon this right, stating “the Government’s activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”2 Fourth Amendment protections therefore apply to conversations taking place
within the telephone booth; these words are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The determination for the Court was whether the search that occurred through recording
protected information was reasonable; it was not, as law enforcement had not acquired a warrant.
The Court has long recognized the importance of “detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate”
prior to law enforcement conducting a search.3 Although this search dealt with an electronic
device, rather than the search or seizure of tangible effects, the protections are equal and thus the
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requirements by law enforcement are equal.4 Although there are certain exceptions to the warrant
requirement, such as searches occurring at the time of arrest to secure the scene, none of these
exceptions can apply to the current case.5 The government requested the creation of a new
exception for cases such as the surveillance of a telephone. However, the Court rejected this
request and cites the precedent case of Beck v. Ohio, holding that circumventing judicial
approval, “bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable
cause.”6 Furthermore, “bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves
individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations ‘only in the discretion of the police.’”7
The concern is therefore not only the ability of a neutral magistrate to recognize probable cause
but also to determine the proper scope of a search. Removing this check would put individuals’
Fourth Amendment protection in the hands of law enforcement, a change that would prevent the
verification of reasonable searches and seizures. The Court emphasized the importance of the
“safeguards” for protecting individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.8
Although much of the language in this case relates to the reasonableness of searches and
seizures using electronic surveillance, its holding remains relevant to discussion of privacy in the
United States. By recognizing the intent of the petitioner to keep information private, the Court
acknowledged the importance of personal privacy as a threshold for Fourth Amendment
protection. In other words, the Court could apply Fourth Amendment protections in cases where
an individual demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy. This concept was further defined
by Justice Harlan’s concurrence, in which he argued that this expectation contains both
subjective and objective components; where a person has an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy that society would reasonably (objectively) view as reasonable, Fourth Amendment
protections exist.9 The Court not only recognized privacy as a component of the Fourth
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Amendment but also provided it equal protections from electronic surveillance as for physical
trespass.
The protection of privacy from government interference provided by the Katz Court also
reflects several aspects of political culture as highlighted in Chapter 3. First, the primary focus of
the discussion surrounding the reasonableness of searches and seizures was on the role of a
neutral magistrate in preventing the overstep of law enforcement. Therefore the Court did not
recognize the importance of privacy from all intrusion, but only overly invasive and thus
unreasonable government intrusion. This framing returns to the concept of the careful balance of
powers within the Constitution to protect citizens from undue government interference and
oppression. Justice Douglas further expanded upon this idea in his concurrence, arguing that
“under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not
supposed to be neutral and disinterested.”10 This is, he noted, especially true for matter regarding
national security. He therefore disagreed with providing the Executive branch with the power to
“resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant … in ‘national security’ matters.”11
Although not binding authority, Justice Douglas detailed a concern about the Executive Branch
circumventing the warrant requirement for national security, and infringing upon the rights of
citizens in the process.
Second, the majority opinion also carefully discussed how privacy is detailed within the
Fourth Amendment, as it provides recognition to the states’ authority in certain regards. The
Court stated, “the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to
privacy.’ That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental
intrusion… Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of
government invasion. But the protection of a person’s general right to privacy – his right to be

70
let alone by other people – is, like the protection of his property and his very life, left largely to
the law of the individual States.”12 From a federal level, the Court is only concerned about
violations of privacy through government intrusion; other aspects of personal privacy remain
with the power of the state. This continued focus on the rights of the states reflects the continued
republican traditions created by the framing of the Constitution, where the federal government
protects citizens from unreasonable government intrusion while leaving significant deference to
the states.

Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001)
The Court also addressed the privacy implications of wiretapping as conducted by private
citizens, rather than by the government. In Bartnicki v. Vopper information from a telephone call
was recorded and released to the press, requiring the Court to look at the intersection between
First Amendment free speech rights and an individual’s right to privacy concerning their
conversations. More specifically, this case involved contentious collective-bargaining
negotiations between a teachers’ union and school board in Pennsylvania, during which a
conversation involving Bartnicki, the union’s primary negotiator, was intercepted, recorded, and
released to several radio stations.13 The interception of the call was held to violate § 2511(1)(c)
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, entitled “Wiretapping
and Electronic,” a law designed to “protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral
communications.”14 The specific section violated applies to any person who, “willfully discloses
or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of

71
a wire or communication.”15 This law was expanded to include radio transmissions through the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.16
However, in the case of Bartnicki, the individual responsible for the recording of the
conversation in question was never discovered; instead, the suit was filed against those,
including Vopper, who had played the conversation on the radio. The case before the Court
therefore related to “the repeated intentional disclosure of an illegally intercepted cellular
telephone conversation about a public issue.” Because the conversation played related to a public
negotiation, it was considered to be a public issue. Despite being a more public issue, there
remain privacy considerations for Bartnicki because of the manner in which the conversation
took place, that being via cellular phone.17 However, the press also has an interest in its ability to
“[publish] matters of public importance.”18 The case before the Court therefore presented “a
conflict between interests of the highest order – on the one hand, the interest in the full and free
dissemination of information concerning public issues, and on the other hand, the interest in
individual privacy and, more specifically, fostering private speech.”19
Although the Court recognized the importance of privacy in telephone conversations,
they ultimately held that the First Amendment protections for the press outweighed privacy
concerns, thus ruling in favor of Vopper. This holding was based on the acceptance of three key
aspects of the respondents’ argument. First, the respondents were not actually involved with the
illegal interception of the conversation. Second, although the conversation itself was recorded
illegally, the respondents’ obtainment of it from the individual who recorded it was legal. Third,
the subject of the conversation was “a matter of public concern.”20 In other words, although the
information was collected illegally, the respondents should not be held liable. Furthermore, the
press has the freedom to publish matters of public concern. The Court noted that this First
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Amendment protection creates an issue for the application of the statute in this case, as “state
action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional
concerns.”21
The Court weighed this First Amendment protection against the privacy considerations
held by the petitioner. They recognized that “privacy of communication is an important interest,”
and is an interest recognized by both judicial precedent and by legislation. Title III of the statute
applied to the case, for example, was created to protect this privacy interest and thus,
“[encourage] the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private parties.”22 Failing
to properly protect this interest, and give individuals reason to believe that their private
conversations could be made public “might well have a chilling effect on private speech.”23
However, the Court also recognized that not all intrusions on privacy are equally offensive and,
because the petitioner was involved in activities of public concern, the related speech had
diminished privacy protections, as “one of the costs associated with participation in public affairs
is an attendant loss of privacy.”24 The Court therefore concluded that “in this case, privacy
concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public
importance.”25
Although this case does not relate to the Fourth Amendment implications of privacy, it
still has important ramifications for a judicial and legislative understanding of privacy. First, the
Court’s protection of individuals’ private conversations is not by any means absolute. It may be
outweighed by the more explicit protections in the Bill of Rights, such as the First Amendment
protection of the freedom of the press. Second, the privacy protections afforded to conversations
are not equal for every individual or every situation. Although they are still protected from the
monitoring and recording prohibited by Title III, conversations concerning points of general
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public interest are not universally protected from the press simply because they may have
originally occurred in a private realm. When these more public matters are concerned, the
priority is an individual’s ability to share truthful information with the public, rather than an
individual’s ability to protect their views from all external actors.
However, this second point was contested by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent, an
opinion with which Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas also joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist
approached the question between the freedom of the press and the right to privacy as both
originating from the First Amendment protections on speech. He argued that the majority
opinion, “diminishes, rather than enhances, the purposes of the First Amendment: chilling the
speech of the millions of Americans who rely upon electronic technology to communicate.”26
Privacy concerns, he argued, are inseparably related to the “desire that personal conversations be
frank and uninhibited,” a desire that would be jeopardized by widespread surveillance and
publicizing of private affairs, even those of potential public interest. By attempting to protect
one aspect of First Amendment protections, the majority created concerning implications for the
First Amendment freedom of speech, as individuals’ concerns that their conversations be made
public could have a “chilling” effect on their speech. Although this was a concern considered by
the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that this chilling effect was properly
avoided through Title III; the statute should therefore have weight over the press interests of the
respondents.27
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is by its nature contrary to the precedent
created by this decision, and therefore not binding authority, it shows the variety of views held
by the justices in relation to privacy issues. The majority let freedom of the press outweigh
privacy interests, but there remain concerns about how failing to protect privacy surrounding
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speech may affect the nature of individuals’ communications. It is also worth drawing attention
to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s use of the First Amendment to recognize individuals’ right to
privacy in relation to their speech. Whereas, the Court in Katz used the Fourth Amendment to
protect individual’s speech, where it maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy, from
government intrusion, the First Amendment may also provide implicit protection of an
individual’s private speech from being brought into the public realm by other individuals.

United States v. Jones (2012)
The Court in United States v. Jones applied some of the legal reasoning evolving from
Katz to a more current technological issue. In Jones, police officers used a Global-PositioningSystem (GPS) tracking device to monitor an individual’s movements in his vehicle, after
suspecting his involvement in trafficking narcotics. Although the police used a variety of
surveillance techniques, the GPS tracking was the only method under contention because the
warrant justifying it was void at the time of installation. The district court in the District of
Columbia had given the government a warrant authorizing the use of a tracking device on the
respondent’s vehicle, to be installed in D.C. borders and within ten days; however, officers
installed the tracking device eleven days later and in Maryland. Because the warrant no longer
applied, a search or seizure could not, under the Fourth Amendment, be constitutional; the
question before the Court was therefore “whether the attachment of a… GPS tracking device to
an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on
public streets constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”28
To determine if a search or seizure occurred, the Court turned to two previous test used in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First is the traditional trespass doctrine from English common
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law, where a physical intrusion or occupation of an individual’s protected property constitutes a
search. This understanding of Fourth Amendment protections reflected the cultural importance of
property rights as a part of the Constitution.29 However, as technology advanced this limited
view of searches and seizures was expanded upon by Justice Harlan’s test in his concurrence in
Katz. As mentioned earlier, this test finds that “a violation occurs when government officers
violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”30 Although the Katz test is more
inclusive of Fourth Amendment violations that involve technology, the Court in Jones was
careful to note that this new test is not a substitute from the common-law trespass doctrine. In
other words, a lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy does not preclude a Fourth
Amendment violation from occurring if a physical intrusion on protected property occurs: “the
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common
law trespassory test.”31 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurs,
the Court thus looks first to whether a physical trespass has occurred; if there has been no
physical intrusion then a determination of a reasonable expectation of privacy may subsequently
establish that a search has occurred.
For the case at bar in Jones, the Court held that the common-law trespass doctrine
provided sufficient means to establish that a search occurred, as the installation of the GPS
tracking device on the respondent’s vehicle “encroached on a protected area.”32 Because of the
physical trespass that occurred, the Court did not need to apply the Katz test to determine
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his long-term movements while
in his vehicle. By focusing solely on the physical trespass side of the Jones investigation, the
Court failed to address the constitutionality of GPS tracking itself, and therefore whether GPS
tracking without an unconstitutional trespass would be constitutional.
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Although the majority opinion failed to rule on this question regarding GPS tracking
itself, Justice Sotomayor addressed the concern in her concurrence. Her concurrence agreed with
the majority’s holding that the government violated the respondent’s Fourth Amendment
protections by, “intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” However, she argued that ending
the analysis there fails to recognize the other Fourth Amendment violation that occurred through
the long-term surveillance; it is also necessary to analyze how expectations of privacy were
implicated. Although this secondary analysis was not necessary to find the government’s actions
in Jones unconstitutional, Justice Sotomayor recognized “physical intrusion is now unnecessary
to many forms of surveillance.”33 These forms of surveillance will therefore soon require the sole
application of the Katz test, a test that she then applies in her concurrence. Justice Sotomayor, as
well as Justice Alito in his concurrence, argued that “longer GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”34
To understand why this violation occurs, Justice Sotomayor drew a comparison between
GPS tracking and traditional police surveillance. Even though similar information can be
obtained through police surveillance, which does not require a warrant, as through GPS
monitoring, because both involve movements on public roads, the implications of GPS
technology for privacy are considerable. She noted, “GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflect a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associations.”35 Although the nature of the
information may be similar to police surveillance, the quantity of information collected may
reveal very private aspects of an individuals regular actions. Furthermore, “because GPS
monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design,
proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement
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practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”36 The inexpensive and efficient
nature of GPS technology may make it an attractive option for law enforcement with limited
resources. However, Justice Sotomayor raised concerns about how the limitless use of this
technology may lead to unchecked police invasion into individuals’ private lives. This practice
would “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
society,” as “awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive
freedoms.”37 The implications of widespread, unchecked GPS tracking, are therefore
considerable enough that they could alter the manner in which individuals act.
Although Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence does not provide binding authority, it does
provide an interpretation of the privacy concerns regarding GPS tracking technology that are
lacking from the majority opinion. Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that while the question at
hand may have been easily resolved through the common-law trespass doctrine, the case had far
greater implications for personal privacy and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
government’s ability to use technology to monitor an individual’s every movement goes beyond
traditional surveillance methods to chip away at the liberties provided by the Bill of Rights. As
noted in Katz, an individual’s Fourth Amendment protections do not disappear when he enters
the public realm, but only where he no longer demonstrates a reasonable expectation of
privacy.38 Although an individual may not have an expectation of privacy in short-term
movements on public roads, Justice Sotomayor acknowledges that this expectation of privacy
does exist when considering the aggregation of one’s movements long-term.
In terms of political culture, the majority opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
highlight the influence of several aspects of American political culture as discussed in Chapter
Four. First, the emphasis on the common-law trespass test to determine when searches and
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seizures occur shows the continued influence of English common law, as well as the importance
of property rights. Be emphasizing the supplementary nature of the Katz test to the trespass
doctrine, the Court ensured the protection of private property from physical intrusion, regardless
of whether there is an expectation of privacy. Thus, although reasonable expectations of privacy
are recognized as providing Fourth Amendment protections, the emphasis is still on the
protection of private property. This represents the original language of the Fourth Amendment,
as protecting individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and not their privacy. Second,
Justice Sotomayor’s concerns about the future implications of GPS tracking reflect a desire to
ensure that Fourth Amendment protections are not diminished by new technology. The
government’s ability to more efficiently conduct surveillance should not excuse invasions into a
person’s private life.

Riley v. California (2014)
In June 2014 the Court issued a joint ruling on two separate cases: Riley v. California and
United States v. Wurie, both of which dealt with a police search of an arrested individual’s cell
phone without acquiring a warrant. In the case of Riley, the petitioner was pulled over for driving
with expired registration tags; his car was impounded and during the routine investigation of the
impounded vehicle law enforcement discovered two handguns. The petitioner was arrested for
possession of a concealed and loaded firearm. During the search of his car, law enforcement
found items associated with a gang, and “went through” the petitioner’s smart phone to look for
incriminating photos of illegal gang activity; they found photos that led to the petitioner being
convicted for attempted murder, among other charges.39 In the case of Wurie, law enforcement
witnessed the respondent make an apparent drug deal, subsequently arresting him. While at the
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police station, the police seized two cell phones on his person, searching one, a flip phone, for
recent calls. Law enforcement was able to use his call log to locate his home phone number and
home address. After acquiring a search warrant, they searched his home, finding illegal drugs, a
firearm and cash; the respondent was convicted of distributing crack cocaine, and two other
related charges. In both cases the defendant sought to suppress all evidence yielded through the
warrantless search of their cell phone.40 Although the cases were argued separately, one opinion
was issued for both due to the similarity of the facts.
The question before the Court was therefore whether police may conduct a search of the
content of an arrestee’s cell phone, as they would with any other effect found on his person at the
time of arrest, without first obtaining a warrant. The Court held that this is an unreasonable
search, and thus an unconstitutional infringement of the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court
has long recognized the right of the government to “search the person of the accused when
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime,”41 they also recognized
that the scope of this government power has been contested for equally as long.42 To determine
the constitutional scope of this power in relation to cell phones the Court turned to three
landmark cases regarding this issue.
First, in Chimel v. California (1969), law enforcement searched the entire home of an
arrestee on the grounds that this search lied within a recognized warrant exception where officers
may protect their own safety by “remov[ing] any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”43 However, the Court held that this exception did not
apply to Chimel, because the search went beyond what was necessary to ensure the security of
the arrest and the safety of the officers. Second, the Court narrowed this holding in United States
v. Robinson (1973), in which an officer inspected a pack of cigarettes found on an arrestee’s
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person, discovering capsules of heroin. The Court held this to be a reasonable search “even
though there was no concern about the loss of evidence, and the arresting officer had no specific
concern that Robinson might be armed.”44 Because the cigarette package was personal property
“immediately associated with the person of the arrestee,” law enforcement was entitled to inspect
it.45 Finally, the Court in Arizona v. Gant (2009), applied these principles to vehicles, adding that
law enforcement may also search a vehicle “when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”46
To apply these principles to the case of cell phones, the Riley Court turned to the
balancing test reflected within these previous decisions. Through this balancing test, the Court
determines when a warrant is necessary for a search at the time of arrest, “by assessing, on the
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy, and on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”47 Unlike in
Robinson, where the concerns about the destruction of evidence and the safety of officers
outweighed the privacy considerations of the individuals, “there is no comparable risk when the
search is of digital data.”48 Although the government in both cases argued that there may be risks
of losing data through encryption or remote wiping, many law enforcement agencies have begun
using “Faraday bags” which isolate the phone from radio waves and thus protect the
government’s interests until a warrant can be acquired without infringing upon the privacy
concerns of the individual.49
The Court then turned its attentions to the other half of the balancing test; what are the
privacy considerations at hand with cell phone technology. Cell phones are able to provide a
greater variety and a greater quantity of information at one’s fingertips than previous technology.
In this sense, “cell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense from other objects
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that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”50 A person would be unlikely to carry with them
every piece of mail they receive, a complete log of all phone call, a full photo album, a rolodex
of contact numbers, or quantities of private information, yet through a cell phone this
information can be now found on their person.51 This quantity and variety of information
available is even greater when cloud computing is taken into consideration, as information stored
remotely can also be accessed through an individual’s cell phone.52 Even if police were to search
a phone only for specific information, they could still discover different information as an
unintended effect of their search. By allowing law enforcement to search an individual’s cell
phone, they would be able to gain a significantly larger quantity and variety of information than
would reasonable ever be available on an arrestee’s person in the pre-digital era – a “significant
diminution of privacy.”53 The Court ultimately recognized that “modern cell phones are not just
another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for
many Americans ‘the privacies of life.”54 The protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
still apply to this information, even though individuals may now carry this information on their
person. The search of a cell phone without a warrant therefore fails the balancing test and is an
unconstitutional infringement of an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment protections.
The decision in Riley also contained several implications for American political culture,
both in terms of state powers and the separation of federal powers. Similarly to Katz v. United
States, the question at bar related to the overstepping of the government during an investigation,
and not the invasion of privacy by other members of society. However, where Katz specifically
noted the role of the state in determining and protecting general rights to privacy, it is worth
noting that the respondent in Riley was the State of California, as the Supreme Court of
California denied the petition for review, while the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Although this is hardly a unique occurrence, it reflects the Court’s willingness to intervene with
state issues related to the infringement of a liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.
The importance of the separation of powers, another element of political culture
discussed in Chapter Four, also appears in Justice Alito’s concurrence. In discussing his concerns
regarding the scope of the majority opinion, he notes the advantage of passing legislation to
clarify the issue, as Congress had done to clarify the use of electronic surveillance after the
decision in Katz. Justice Alito states that “because of the role that these devices have come to
play in contemporary life, searching their contents implicates very sensitive privacy interests that
this Court is poorly positioned to understand and evaluate.” By contrast, “legislatures, elected by
the people, are in a better position…to assess and respond to the changes that have already
occurred and those that will almost certainly take place in the future.”55 Whereas the Court often
addresses the need to prevent government oppression, it is interesting how the separation of
powers may also be used, albeit in a concurrence, to offer power from the judicial branch to the
legislature.

Conclusion
Through these four decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that a qualified right to
privacy exists and is provided a certain degree of protection. As the Court held in Katz, the
Fourth Amendment may provide this protection when a reasonable expectation of privacy is
infringed by a governmental investigation. The specific test created by Justice Harlan in his
concurrence for this case, has been applied by the Court to determine when a reasonable
expectation of privacy occurs. Although the Jones Court did not need to apply the Katz test, as a
physical trespass had occurred which automatically classified the investigation as a search,
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Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence stressed the need to address how privacy is implicated by
advanced electronic surveillance. The Court addressed this question three years later in Riley,
where they recognized the unique nature of cell phones, in comparison to other effects an
individual may carry on their person, and held that law enforcement must acquire a warrant prior
to searching an arrestee’s cell phone. However, privacy is not solely protected from government
intrusion. The Bartnicki Court recognized the privacy of individual conversations which may be
protected from intrusion and publication by other individuals. Although the Court ultimately held
that other liberties protected by the Bill of Rights may outweigh privacy interests in certain
cases, it upheld the general ruling that private communications warrant a certain degree of
protection.
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Chapitre Six: Jurisprudence française sur la vie privée
Introduction
Dans Chapitre Quatre j’ai examiné les aspects de la culture politique en France qui
viennent de: la Déclarations des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, et de la Constitution de la Ve
République. Dans Chapitre Six , je prends cette connaissance de la culture politique et je
l’applique à une analyse des décisions de la Cour de Cassation concernant la vie privée.
J’analyse quatre cas, et chacun concerne un aspect différent de la vie privée lié aux avances
technologiques. Puisque la Cour nomme ses cas avec les chiffres et pas avec des noms des
parties représentées, (comme le fait la Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis), je les identifie seulement
par les chiffres. J’étudie le cas 86-90297 (1987), qui concerne l’écoutes téléphoniques, le cas 1011777 (2011), qui concerne la fouille gouvernementale des portables technologiques, et les cas
11-84308 (2011) et 12-82391 (2014) qui concernent l’utilisation du GPS pour le pistage. Pendant
la lecture des ces cas j’utilise une série des questions (Figure 1) pour assurer une analyse
standardisée de chaque cas.
Avant de commencer cet analyse, je veux brièvement discuter comment les cas
judiciaires en France sont différents des cas judiciaires aux Etats-Unis. D’abord, le système
judiciaire français a une influence plus romaine, comparé au système américain qui est influencé
plus par le système anglais. C’est à dire que le système français utilise plus la codification dans
les décisions tandis que le système américain compte sur le précédent créé par la jurisprudence.
Le résultat est que les décisions françaises sont souvent plus courts et directement affiché que
ceux des Etats-Unis. À la place d’une analyse longue des principes légales, La Cour française
applique et interprète simplement le code français aux situations contestées.1 Bien que nous
voyions l’évolution des conceptions légaux moins dans ces décisions, on peut encore voir

86
comment la Cour de Cassation interprète le droit individuel à la vie privée vis-à-vis des
nouveaux modes de surveillance, comme les écoutes téléphoniques et la géolocalisation.
L’application du code, et les articles du code eux-mêmes, peuvent aussi nous offrir un moyen de
mieux comprendre l’interprétation de la culture politique dans les normes légales nationales en
France.

Figure 1: Questions pour les cas judiciaires français
13. Quelle est la question constitutionnelle revue par la Cour ?
14. Quel est le résultat du cas ? Est-ce que la Cour a prononcé un jugement
favorable ou opposé à la vie privée?
15. Auxquels tests ou principes légaux la Cour a-t-elle recours ?
16. La Cour cite-t-elle les cas précédents signifiants ; si oui, augmente ou a
diminue les protections de la vie privée ?
17. Quels éléments de la culture politique sont évidents dans la décision ?
18. La Cour cite-t-elle des lois internationales ou des décisions des cours
internationales ?

86-90297 (1987) : Écoutes téléphoniques
Dans cet appel du 11 février 1987, la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de Cassation
considère le pourvoi contre un arrêt de la Cour d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence. Ce cas porte sur
l’arrêt d’un homme qui a porté « l’atteinte à l’intimité de la vie privée et utilisation
d’installations de télécommunications sans autorisations. »2 Le prévenu a été trouvé coupable par
les juges de fond d’avoir écouté et enregistré les conversations de son épouse. Le prévenu a
commencé ces écoutes en 1982, après que sa femme a constaté l’installation d’un téléphone dans
l’appartement, sans savoir que son épouse y avait mis aussi des appareils enregistreurs. Il a
justifié cet enregistrement en disant qu’il avait « les doutes sur la fidélité de son épouse. »3 En
1983, le couple a reçu, pendant une procédure de divorce, une ordonnance de non conciliation, et
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la femme a démarré son propre entreprise. Le prévenu a continué d’enregistrer les conversations
de sa femme chez elle et à son bureau. Il constate d’avoir « fait placer le matériel pour écouter
les communications de son épouse ».
Par conséquent, la question devant la Cour est si cet enregistrement téléphonique est une
atteinte criminelle de la vie privée. Pour déterminer la constitutionalité de l’arrêt et la
condamnation, la Cour se tourne à la logique employée par la cour d’appel. D’abord, la Cour
d’appel reconnaît que les appareils étaient dans le logement du prévenu et « qu’il ne peut y avoir
atteinte à la vie privée d’installer un système d’écoute sur les lignes téléphoniques situées dans
son propre domicile tout autant que celui de sa femme. »4 Mais, il a continué de le faire après le
divorce et dans l’appartement de son anicienne épouse ainsi que dans son bureau. De plus, la
Cour souligne l’importance du caractère des conversations ; l’atteinte de la vie privée « n’est
constitué[e] que si les conversations surprises ont un caractère privé. »5 Bien que les juges de
fond n’aient pas fait une analyse des ces conversations, la nature des enregistrements constatés
par le prévenu délinéent un caractère privé. Enfin, l’aveu du prévenu qu’il a écouté et enregistré
les conversations de son épousé pendant et après leur mariage, et dans leur résidence aussi que
dans son bureau, montre une atteinte de la vie privée. Malgré les violations mineures de la Cour
d’appel, comme l’échec de rechercher le caractère exacte des conversations enregistrées, la Cour
de Cassation reconnaît que la décision est valide, disant que, « exemptes d’insuffisance et de
contradiction, la Cour d’appels a caractérisé en tous ses éléments constitutifs, le délit d’atteinte à
l’intimité de la vie privée. »6 Donc, la Cour rejette le pourvoi.
Bien que la Cour ait rejeté le pourvoi, cet appel néanmoins reflète les aspects de la
culture politique en France. D’abord ce cas concerne l’atteinte à la vie privée d’un individu par
un individu, et pas par l’État. Donc il reflète que les citoyens ont de la protection universelle de
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ces types de violations, et pas simplement la protection de l’atteinte gouvernementale. Ce point
de vue montre un de piliers de la Déclaration des droit de l’homme et du citoyen ; ce document a
créé plus des libertés individuelles qui sont protégées de l’oppression de l’État, il a créé aussi une
société cohésive et réglée. De plus, ce rejet ne discute pas les différences entre les écoutes
téléphoniques et les atteintes de la vie privée plus traditionnelles, comme la violation de la
propriété. La simplicité de la décision montre aussi l’empressement de la Cour de reconnaître la
surveillance électronique comme une atteinte de la vie privée similaire aux ceux de l’époque prénumérique. Enfin, bien que cette décision soit un rejet d’un appel, elle montre les connaissances
simples et culturelles sur l’utilisation de la surveillance électronique qui viole la vie privée.

10-11777 (2011) : Saisie d’informations électroniques
Cet appel du 18 janvier 2011 vient d’une cour d’appel à Paris pour que la Chambre
commerciale de la Cour de Cassation puisse le considérer. Ce cas concerne une investigation
autorisée par le tribunal de grande instance à Paris pour rechercher la fraude fiscale. La cour a
donné le pouvoir aux agents de l’administration des impôts à faire des opérations de visite et de
saisie des endroits probablement utilisés par les chefs de l’entreprise en question. Selon l’ordre
judicaire, ils ont saisi un ordinateur portable et un disque dur externe qui avaient été scellés par
les propriétaires. Ensuite, les investigateurs ont copié certains fichiers de l’ordinateur et toutes
les informations du disque qui ont été restituées par le prévenu. L’entreprise en question a fait
recours contre le déroulement de ces opérations.7 La décision de la Cour à propos de la légalité
de l’investigation est une réponse à chaque action prise par les avocats de l’entreprise.
En général, les avocats pour l’entreprise proposent des moyens au sujet des détails plus
petits de l’investigation et pas l’investigation elle-même. Par exemple, ils affirment que « la
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signature du procès-verbaux des opérations de visite et de saisie et d’inventaire de saisie sans
réserve ne constitue pas une renonciation à exercer les voies de recours ouvertes à la loi à tous
les intéressés. »8 Autrement dit, quand les prévenus ont signé le procès-verbaux, ils n’ont pas
abandonné leurs droits comme citoyens de faire des appels à propos de la manière dans laquelle
les informations ont été ramassées. De plus, cette signature ça ne donne pas de liberté illimitée à
l’investigation de saisir, de copier, et d’utiliser tout ce qu’ils ont trouvé. Le gouvernement a
toujours l’obligation de faire une inventaire complète des documents saisis, une exigence que
l’entreprise soutient n’était pas faite correctement.9 Enfin, les avocats pour l’entreprise affirment
que la saisie de la correspondance entre les avocats et l’entreprise était une saisie illégale.10
Cependant, la Cour décide que ces moyens ont été fondés sur les contresens des processus faits
pendant l’investigation et les pouvoirs donnés à l’enquête par la cour de grande instance à Paris ;
la Cour rejette le pourvoi.11
Puisque ce cas concerne la légalité d’une saisie d’informations électroniques d’une
entreprise, sa signifiance pour la vie privée n’est pas immédiatement évidente. Cependant, le
concept de la vie privée est mentionné dans un des moyens annexe de l’opinion. Les avocats
pour l’entreprise font référence à l’article 8 de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme
qui constate que, « toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale, de son domicile
et de sa correspondance. »12 La saisie des correspondances entre les prévenus et leurs avocats
transgresse, selon cet argument, ce droit internationalement reconnu. Quoique la Cour ne
mentionne pas cette protection spécifiquement, l’inclusion de cet argument par les avocats
montre que le droit international est une considération de la communauté légale. Cette mention
fait référence aussi aux conséquences sur la vie privée de l’investigation, et a l’argument que
l’étendue de la saisie des informations constitue une atteinte du droit. Puis, les arguments revus
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par la Cour reflètent des soucis implicites liés à la vie privée. Les arguments concernant
l’étendue des saisies et l’investigation en général reflètent l’idée que la vie privée puisse être
violée même en cas de mandat judicaire.
En outre, la culture politique est reflétée dans les références à la séparation des pouvoirs.
Les avocats des prévenus disent que « l’administration est en droit d’appréhender tous les
documents » qui sont « visés par l’ordonnance judiciaire autorisant les opérations de visite et
saisie. »13 Alors, ils reconnaissent la capacité de l’administration de faire des saisies
d’informations privées à cause de l’autorisation judiciaire qui détermine la légalité des saisies. Il
y a une équilibre entre les communications privées d’un acteur, dans ce cas une entreprise, et
l’intérêt gouvernemental d’appliquer les lois. Les enquêtes seront légales pourvu qu’ils suivent
les lois démocratiquement créées, c’est à dire, le Code français. Dans ce sens, ce cas reflète des
aspects Du Contrat Social de Rousseau dans lequel il reconnaît la nécessité de protéger les droits
individuels du despotisme mais en même temps de créer une société cohésive et bien
fonctionnante des individus qui est basée sur le compromis.

11-84308 (2011) : Écoutes téléphoniques et géolocalisation
Ce pourvoi du 22 novembre 2011 devant la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de Cassation,
concerne une investigation des prévenus soupçonnés des crimes liées aux stupéfiants et le
blanchiment d’argent. Les quatre prévenus ont fait des appels séparés en réponse aux formes de
surveillance utilisées pendant l’investigation : les écoutes téléphoniques, la géolocalisation des
véhicules, et la sonorisation et la captation d’images d’un parking souterrain.14 À cause des
similarités des pourvois, la Cour les analyse ensemble. Dans leur décision, la Cour répond aux
cinq arguments des avocats pour les prévenus à propos des atteintes légales spécifiques. En
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général, les avocats soutiennent que l’investigation a enfreint les articles de quatre systèmes
légaux différents : article 16 de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, articles 16 et
66 de la Constitution, article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, et plusieurs
sections du code de procédure pénale.15
Premièrement, les avocats pour les prévenus affirment que la saisie de la localisation et la
liste des appels des trois lignes téléphoniques en question n’était pas suffisamment autorisée. Les
officiers de la police ont reçu l’autorisation du procureur de la République mais cela n’est pas,
selon les avocats, l’autorisation nécessaire ; c’est à dire, l’autorisation d’un juge. La manque
d’autorisation d’une partie neutre la rend nulle.16 La Cour n’est pas d’accord avec cet argument.
Selon elle, il y avait suffisamment de soupçon pour justifier cette mesure, conformément au code
du procédure pénale, sans violer le droit de liberté protégé par l’article 5 de la Convention
européenne des droits de l’homme.17 La Cour ainsi rejette ce premier argument. Les avocats font
un argument similaire à propos de l’autorisation déplacée de la géolocalisation ; cet argument est
également rejeté par la Cour pour des raisons similaires.18
Les autres trois moyens faits par les avocats concernent des débats plus techniques. Par
exemple, le deuxième moyen affirme que les enquêteurs n’ont pas fini les écoutes téléphoniques
avant la date donnée par l’autorisation, un fait incorrect rejeté par la Cour.19 Le cinquième
argument soutient aussi que les informations saisies pendant l’investigation étaient en dehors de
celles dictées par le juge d’instruction.20 Cependant, la Cour trouve que le juge avait permis
l’investigation de certains faits, ce qui à mené à d’autres informations suspicieuses, alors
l’enquête sur toutes les informations est permissible. Le dernier moyen technique utilisé par les
avocats est un peu plus pertinent à la vie privée parce qu’il concerne la nature d’un parking
souterrain où les enquêteurs ont fait les opérations de sonorisation et a pris des images. Les
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avocats soutiennent que le parking, qui est sous d’un immeuble, constitue un « lieu
d’habitation » et pas un « lieu privé » ; donc, il faut avoir des autorisations spéciales pour y faire
des investigations.21 La Cour trouve que la mise en place des dispositifs techniques était faite
selon les directives données par le code du procédure pénale. Enfin, la Cour rejette entièrement
le pourvoi.

12-82391 (2014) : La géolocalisation
Dans cet appel du 15 octobre 2014, la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de Cassation
considère un cas où les autorités ont utilisé la géolocalisation sur un véhicule comme un de leurs
modes d’investigation des suspects. À la fin de l’investigation, les suspects ont été reconnus
coupables de plusieurs crimes liées aux activités criminelles associées avec les bandes
organisées, telles que le vol avec arme, l’assassinat, les tentatives d’assassinat, et les infractions à
la législation sur les armes. Les convictions viennent de deux arrêts différents, alors les avocats
pour la défense font deux arguments pendant l’appel.22 Le premier concerne principalement
l’utilisation de la géolocalisation tandis que le deuxième répond aux classifications des
convictions données comparées aux crimes faites. Dans les deux arguments, le conseiller fait
appel à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et du code de procédure pénale en
France.23
Le premier argument soutient que l’usage de la géolocalisation, mise sur le véhicule d’un
des suspects, constitue une atteinte à la vie privée. La Cour répond à l’argument en constatant
que l’usage de la géolocalisation n’est jamais explicitement adressée dans le droit français. Par
conséquent, ils se tournent aux autres parties du code de procédure pénale en vigueur, plus
spécifiquement les articles 12, 14, et 41, qui, «confient à la police judiciaire le soin de ‘constater
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les infractions à la loi pénale, d’en rassembler les preuves et d’en rechercher les autres’ sous le
contrôle du procureur de la République ».24 La police a suivi les procédures pour les autres
modes d’investigation ; la question est alors si la géolocalisation nécessite plus de contrôle à
cause de sa nature plus envahissante. La Cour décide que ces nouvelles procédures ne sont pas
nécessaires parce que la géolocalisation ne conduit qu’aux mêmes données informatiques que
surveillance visuelle, la forme plus traditionnelle de surveillance. En outre, la Cour revoit la
condition du véhicule, qui avait une ouverture suspecte dans la carrosserie, et donc, a donné aux
officiers la cause de l’investiguer plus profondément. 25
Ensuite, les avocats pour les prévenus font référence à la Convention européenne des
droits de l’homme. Ils soutiennent que la police a violé l’article 6, §1, de la Convention, qui
constate que, « Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue équitablement,
publiquement et dans un délai raisonnable, par un tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi par la
loi, qui décidera, soit des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractère civil, soit du
bien-fondé de toute accusation en matière pénale dirigée contre elle. »26 Les avocats affirment
que l’usage de la géolocalisation a eu lieu sans considération appropriée par des parties neutres.
Elle a donc influencé injustement le reste des procédures judiciaires. Cet atteinte aussi représente
un abus de pouvoir que l’article 6 de la Convention interdit.27 L’argument mentionne aussi
l’article 8 de la Convention, déjà cité dans la discussion du cas 10-11777. Cet article donne plus
de protections aux individus contre l’intrusion injustifiée du gouvernement ; cependant, la Cour
décide que ce mode de surveillance n’est pas plus envahissant que d’autres. Le droit européen et
français ne créent pas de « liste limitative de moyens d’investigations, » alors les juridictions
peuvent les interpréter par rapport aux techniques nouvelles.28 Enfin, les avocats citent une
décision de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme de 1984, qui applique l’article 8, en

94
disant, « dans le contexte de mesures de surveillance secrète la loi doit user de termes assez clairs
pour indiquer à tous de manière suffisante en quelles circonstances et sous quelles conditions elle
habilité la puissance publique à recourir à de telle mesures. »29 Cependant, la Cour affirme que
les articles 12, 14, et 41 du code de procédure pénale donne cette direction claire nécessitée par
la Cour européenne. Par conséquent, ce premier argument n’est pas admis par la Cour.
De plus, les avocats promeuvent un deuxième moyen, celui désigné à adresser la
classification des convictions des prévenus. Alors, ce moyen se concentre principalement sur les
désaccord entre les histoires des prévenus et des investigateurs, et sur les lois concernant les
classifications des crimes. Par conséquent, ce deuxième moyen n’est pas pertinent aux
considérations de la vie privée ou même à la surveillance ; en bref, la Cour n’a pas admis le
moyen et le pourvoi en général a été rejeté. Les détails importants de ce cas viennent du premier
moyen et les interprétations faites par la Cour. La Cour considère comment les protections
individuelles données par le droit français et le droit européen s’appliquent aux nouvelles
manières de surveillance, et décident que la géolocalisation est légale dans ce cas parce qu’elle
est similairement que les autres modes de surveillance. Donc, l’usage de la géolocalisation sur
une véhicule dans le contexte de cette investigation ne nécessite pas d’interprétation nouvelle des
lois existantes. Dans un contexte culturel, cette décision reflète comment le droit individuel à la
vie privée est nuancé, surtout en termes d’une investigation qui concerne le bien-être de la
société en général. Si les autorités suivent les règles mis en place pour la protection des individus
contre l’abus de pouvoir, ces types d’infractions de la vie privée peuvent être légales.
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Conclusion
Ces cas judiciaires montrent comment la Cour de Cassation en France a interprété le droit
pertinent en France pour déterminer la légalité des surveillances faites par le gouvernement et par
les individus avec l’usage de la nouvelle technologie. Principalement la Cour fait référence au
code pénal français pour ces interprétations mais avec les trois cas les plus récents, nous voyons
que le droit international, plus spécifiquement la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme,
devient une considération importante. En outre, ces décisions montrent que la reconnaissance de
la vie privée existe déjà dans les lois nationales et internationales mais que la Cour accepte
comme légales deux atteintes de ce droit. Premièrement, si la personne qui fait l’atteinte à la vie
privée de l’autre est l’épouse du victime, comme dans le cas 86-90297, la Cour reconnaît leur vie
privée ensemble sans l’intrusion de l’État. Deuxièmement, si l’atteinte est faite par un agent de la
loi qui a de la cause probable à faire une investigation pour protéger le reste de la communauté,
cette atteinte est légale s’il suit les directives du code pénal français. Donc, la jurisprudence
française sur la vie privée souligne comment la Cour a trouvé un équilibre entre les droits
individuels et les intérêts gouvernementaux.
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Chapter Seven: Analysis and Conclusion
Introduction
Through this study I explore how political cultural affects the degree to which domestic
legal understandings of privacy are consistent with the international norms. I use aspects of
Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process in order to understand why privacy norms
differ by country. To review, Koh explains transnational legal process as, “the theory and
practice of how public and private actors… interact in a variety of public and private, domestic
and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of transnational
law.”1 It is this process of internalization around which I base my study, by using Supreme Court
decisions in France and the United States to track how international norms correlate with
domestic legal understandings. Although I am unable to prove a causal relationship between the
two variables, and thus show if norms are truly internalized, I can make conclusions about the
level of consistency between domestic and international norms. Furthermore, I am specifically
interested in how political culture affects this consistency. As noted in Chapter One, I
hypothesize that political culture acts as a conditional variable on the relationship between
international norms and domestic law; it can therefore explain why normative understandings of
privacy law differ in France and the United States.

Analysis
In order to give the necessary context to my analysis, it is important to briefly discuss the
inherent differences between the legal systems in question. The American legal system, as noted
in Chapter Five, is founded on English common law and therefore is greatly based on precedent.
To make judicial rulings the Court not only looks to the Constitution and to statutory laws
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created through legislative processes, but also to how similar questions have been previously
evaluated and interpreted in previous decisions. Future decisions therefore indicate an evolution
in terms of how a constitutional or statutory principle has been understood and re-evaluated as
society changes. However, this same concept of judicial precedent is not applicable to the French
judicial system, because, as noted in Chapter Six, the French primarily draw from the Roman
judicial system, which emphasizes codification over precedent. As a result, French Supreme
Court decisions do not draw from preceding cases, but rather from parts of the French Civil or
Criminal Code, as well as specific international laws. This approach implies more shorter, less
analytic judicial decisions, where the court weighs the facts of the case against the specific
details of the statute to determine if an infringement has occurred.
A primary theme of significance for my research question relates to how the separation of
powers is used as a tool for protecting the privacy rights of individuals. Although in national
security issues the separation of powers more often relates to presidential and judicial powers
broadly, this is manifested more often in my cases as a separation between the police and the
judicial branch. French case 12-82391, for example, reflects a lack of clear boundary between
the police and judicial duties, as reflected by the legality of prosecutorial approval for digital
surveillance, instead of approval from a neutral magistrate. Less judicial oversight exists for
police action throughout the process because numerous guidelines are put on police action
through legislative action, as demonstrated by the extent to which appellate review relies on the
French code.2 U.S. case Katz v. United States, by contrary, highlights the role of the judicial
branch as a separate but vital actor in the investigative process. The court in Katz put significant
emphasis on the importance of the warrant as a means of putting necessary limits on police
action that ensure the protection of an individual’s fundamental constitutional liberties.3
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The difference in the degree of separation between the executive and judicial branches
primarily reflects a difference in political culture. In France, the legislative branch is given
significant power to preserve the rights of the individual, as it is the French code on which both
the judicial and executive branches rely. In the United States the judicial branch has a more
constant check on investigations throughout and after the investigative process. Ultimately, the
U.S. and France, in Katz and 12-82391 respectively, still recognize the rights of the individual to
be secure from unwarranted government intrusion; it is the process government action must take
that differs as a result of political culture, not protection of the right itself. Thus, although it
manifests itself differently due to political culture, the careful separation of power remains a tool
for ensuring the protection of individual privacy rights in both countries.
The position of the actor infringing another’s privacy rights also influences the
application of privacy law. It is the person or institution responsible for the infringement of
privacy that is most notably addressed in these decisions. The degree to which the courts allow
this actor’s interests to outweigh an individual’s right to privacy often depends on whether they
are private or government actor. The courts in both countries give greater protection to
individuals against government intrusion. For example, in the three U.S. cases that involved a
police investigation (Katz, Jones, and Riley), the Court required strict adherence to a warrant and
other standard procedures designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights whenever the
investigation involved either a physical trespass or a violation of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Similar protections exist in the French cases, although, as previously noted, they
primarily come from the French code. The Courts in both countries are careful to preserve an
individual’s right to privacy, whether in relation to their movements, their conversations, or their
personal effects, from overly intrusive government action.
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However, these protections are not uniformly applied, as they may diminish when the
actor responsible for the infringement of privacy is another individual. In other words, the
protection of privacy may be outweighed by other legal or constitutional considerations. For
example, in the U.S. case of Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court applied a balancing test between one
individual’s right to privacy and another’s right to the freedom of the press under the First
Amendment. Because this case dealt with a balancing of individual rights, rather than a balance
between a state interest and an individual right, the right to privacy did not receive guaranteed
preference and could be more easily outweighed. The French case 86-90297, which dealt with a
husband wiretapping his ex-wife’s phones, similarly provided a different view of privacy right
than in the cases dealing with governmental intrusion of privacy. Because of the facts of the case,
the Court looked not only at the privacy rights of the victim of the wiretapping, but also the
privacy allotted to the relationship between the parties. The Court held that while the individuals
were married, any wiretapping was not illegal, but following the divorce it became an
infringement on the wife’s private life, and thus criminal activity. This case also concerns the
power of the State in relation to privacy issues because the relationship of the married couple is
granted such a degree of privacy that the State is unable to intervene to protect the privacy of one
of the individuals. In both countries, the protection of the individual’s privacy is more dynamic
and dependent on other factors when it is infringed by another private individual, rather than by
the government.
The power acknowledged by the Court to violate a right to privacy is also affected by the
nature of the individual whose right is being infringed. The extent to which an individual’s life is
subject to public scrutiny is, for example, a considerable factor when the Court determines what
level of protection the individual’s right to privacy receives, as was the case in the U.S. Supreme
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Court’s decision in Bartnicki. Because the individual whose private conversations were
publicized had a public role in a labor union, the Court found that his conversations related to
that function were considered less private and thus were subject to a lesser degree of protection.
Similarly, in the French case 10-11777, which concerned government seizure of a laptop and
other technological effects as a part of a tax fraud investigation, the Court reviewed a case where
the individuals in question were in a different position than the average individual under
investigation. In 10-1177, the owners of the laptop and other electronics were also leaders of the
company under investigation; their expectation of privacy over the seized effects was affected by
the public nature of the company. However, in reviewing the possibility of a violation of privacy,
the Court, in this case the Commercial chamber of the Court of Cassation, analyzed the
individual right to privacy in a similar manner to the other studied cases, which appeared before
the Criminal chamber. Because the investigation carefully followed the limits of the judicial
authorization, it was considered a legal breach of privacy.
The varying degree of privacy rights afforded to individuals, although a standard concept
between the two countries, manifests itself differently in France and the U.S. and reflects aspects
of each country’s political culture. In France, the Rousseauian tradition is where the right to
privacy is more general, and not just a right to privacy from unwarranted government invasion.
The United States Bill of Rights protects individuals from government intrusion, not from
individuals’ transgressions. Although the law protects against individuals, such as Title III of the
law cited in Bartnicki, the priority is to protect against government intrusion.4 Again, each court
provides a recognition of the right to privacy that should be protected, although this recognition
is somewhat influenced by political culture. However, the nature of the actor whose privacy is
infringed and the actor who is violating it also affects the degree of protection granted.

102
The degree to which each country’s court draws from international law is another
interesting detail linked to political culture. While the French court in these cases never explicitly
uses international law, either from the United Nations or the European Union, attorneys appeal to
the logic and validity of international law to support their arguments. In both 10-11777 and 1282391, the appeals cite the European Convention on Human Rights, a convention adopted in
1950 that made the protections of the UDHR binding for countries in the European Union.5
Contrarily, the United States Supreme Court never cites international law in the three decisions
cited, nor does the decision mention any of the briefs submitted making an appeal to
international law. Although the weight given to international law is not specifically linked to the
historical aspects of political culture discussed in Chapter Four, for France it represents the
evolution of political culture with the country’s membership in the European Union. For the
United States, the lack of reference to international law, at least in these four privacy cases,
demonstrates the overwhelming priority given to sovereign, domestic law.
A final consideration relates to the manner in which each country adapts their
conceptions of privacy protections to changing technology. This is one area where political
culture seems particularly relevant, as the cultural influences on the judiciary affect the manner
in which privacy norms are reconsidered in relation to new technology. The U.S. Supreme Court
draws from its English common law heritage by heavily relying on judicial precedent. This
evolution can be seen in the four U.S. privacy cases, beginning with Katz v. United States, where
the Court builds off of previous search and seizure cases in order to create a new understanding
of how privacy applies to individuals under the Fourth Amendment. The Katz test is then cited in
both Jones and Riley as a principle from which the Court can draw for understanding how
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foundational understandings of Fourth Amendment protections, and privacy rights by extension,
can be applied to newer technology such as GPS and cell phones.
By contrast, the French court is influenced by the codifying traditions of Roman law. As
mentioned earlier, rather than interpreting previous decisions, the Court of Cassation determines
whether current French code may apply or if new law is needed. For example, in case 11-84308
from November 22, 2011, the Court considered the legality of a police investigation involving
the use of GPS on a car. Although the French code did not specifically address the legality of
such technology, the Court was able to apply existing legal norms regarding searches to the
question at bar. The Court determined that because similar information could be obtained
through visual surveillance and that the application of the GPS technology was authorized by the
necessary authorities, it was no different from less advanced forms of surveillance already
considered acceptable. The decisions from both Courts suggest that new legislation is not always
necessary for a court to evaluate how privacy norms apply to new technology. Whether through
the application of pre-existing judicial principles and tests or parts of the legal code, both Courts
are able to adapt current law to emerging technologies. However, this raises the question as to
whether existing legal foundations are adequate for understanding how privacy rights are
implicated by more invasive technological means of investigation.
There are therefore four main patterns evident within the eight court decisions in my
study. First, the effects of political culture on the separation of powers alters the process through
which the State reviews privacy rights, although it does not affect the State’s recognition and
protection of the rights themselves. Second, the ability to outweigh an individual’s right to
privacy is determined by the nature of the actor responsible for the infringement; the
government, for example, is often less able to infringe upon privacy rights than another private
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individual. The public or private nature of the individual whose rights are affected also impacts
the degree to which courts recognize the right to privacy. Third, the degree to which courts
specifically cite international laws also signifies an important cultural difference. Fourth, the
method of reviewing judicial questions, which is highly affected by political culture, is often
responsible for how privacy protections are applied to new issues of technology. However, the
difference in how new issues are reviewed, in weighing new technology against privacy
interests, does not diminish the established recognitions of privacy.

Conclusion
The eight court decisions reviewed appear to provide support for the hypothesis that
political culture affects the relationship between international law and domestic law, but also
influences the degree to which domestic judicial decisions are consistent with international
norms. Through the decisions studied, characteristics of international laws, such as protection
against arbitrary interference with an individual’s privacy, were mirrored in aspects of the
Court’s reasoning. The notable differences between French and U.S. court decisions derived
from the manner in which these questions were reviewed. Because the manner of reviewing
questions is heavily dependent on political culture, it would seem that, in the context of this
study, political culture acts as a conditional variable.
To measure the relationship between international and domestic law, I primarily draw
from Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process, which he defines as being
nontraditional, nonstatist, dynamic, and normative.6 I focus on the latter two of these
characteristics, by viewing international law, or transnational law as Koh would view it, as
dynamic, in the sense that it is constantly changing and evolving, and normative because it is
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based on norms. The significance that Koh puts on the normative component of transnational law
helps explain how there is a notable consistency between the recognized privacy protections on
an international and domestic level, even when courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, do not
specifically cite or consider international law in their decisions. Because my study highlights the
extent to which privacy norms are consistent between domestic and international law, it supports
aspects of Koh’s theory of transnational legal process. The influential role of political culture can
thus provide greater context for understanding how transnational legal processes may
realistically play out in different cultural contexts.
My study can also help to address some of the earlier concerns voiced by international
legal scholars. Scholars such as Daniel Bethlehem, Jagdish Bhagwati, and Rafael Domingo have
voiced that international law is inadequate to deal with the increase in globalization where
interactions are no longer as limited by sovereign borders.7 However, by focusing on how
international law becomes a set of norms that are internalized by individual countries,
international law can still be relevant to an increasingly globalized world. The consistency
between privacy law between the UDHR and U.S. case law, even though the U.S. Supreme
Court, never explicitly cites international law would suggest that the process of internalization is
not always a conscious, political action. As such, it would pose less of a direct threat to a
country’s sovereignty; instead of being a challenge to a domestic country’s laws, international
norms complement domestic judicial analysis and become a part of domestic law. However, it is
also possible that the consistency between domestic and international law in this case is simply
the result of the countries studied having a major role in the creation of international law.
Because they also created these laws, assimilation to new international norms was never
necessary to the same extent that it may have been for other countries or for other laws.
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Transnational legal process, as applied in this study, also provides another layer to an
understanding the efficacy of different sources of law. Although Larry May discussed the
manners in which soft sources of international law, such as jus cogens norms, may supersede
hard sources of international law, such as treaties, the distinction between these sources may be
less distinct.8 My method of operationalizing my independent variable includes understanding
“hard sources” of international law, such as the UDHR, as representative of international norms,
or “soft sources”. By considering hard and softs sources as inherently linked, it is easier to
understand how soft sources of international law may help countries to implement hard sources
of international law. In other words, we can better understand how aspects of international laws
are implemented on a domestic level by looking more specifically at how the relevant
international norms have been internalized. This unification of hard and soft sources also
provides support for H.L.A. Hart’s argument that international law, despite being difficult to
enforce, may gain legitimacy through practice and general acceptance.9 Although Hart proposes
a more positivist view of international law, where laws are clearly written and defined, the
practice and acceptance of law demonstrates a normative element that, if applied to more general
international norms, may assist with a more broader implementation and recognition of
international legal concepts.

Questions for Future Research
There are numerous opportunities for the results of the study to be expanded upon or
simply drawn from in future studies. First, the design of my study is primarily based around
Koh’s third and fourth characteristics of transnational legal process, as my research focuses on
laws being dynamic in normative. One way of expanding upon my own research is to better
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consider and apply the first two characteristics of Koh’s theory of transnational legal process:
nontraditional and nonstatist. Consideration of these factors would require a research design that
analyzes the manifestation of international norms in a context other than formal court decisions,
as the judicial branch still fits into a more traditional, state-centered classification. Other aspects
of a country’s culture, such as business actions or the media, may provide a more nuanced view
of the process through which international norms are fully internalized within a country.
Similarly, an analysis of media portrayals of privacy could indicate a difference between how
governments internalize norms and how people understand privacy.
The scope of my study was limited to a narrow class of international law: privacy law as
it applies to individual liberties. To better understand the relationship between international
norms, domestic law, and political culture it would be beneficial to conduct apply similar
methods to other areas of law. I studied international laws that more abstractly recognized human
rights, therefore leaving a certain degree of variability when applied in domestic law. If my
research design were applied to more concrete, detail-oriented international law, this would
allow scholars to better understand the discrepancies between domestic and international law, as
well as how political culture explains these differences. This would also help us to understand if
more abstract norms are better internalized than specific international law, and to what extent
this may be true. Furthermore, applying this model to privacy court decisions in other countries
with a greater difference in political cultures may provide greater evidence for the role of
political in the internalization process. My research indicated high consistency between
international norms and domestic judicial decisions; however, further research could help us
better understand if this consistency would remain true for other forms of international law or in
other countries. Similarly, further research could be done on the extent to which courts cite
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international law in other areas and the other aspects of political culture that may influence this
level of citation.
There are also other areas for future research by applying my research design to a greater
variety of case law. For example, my conception of privacy in the context of newer technology
was somewhat limited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of the Fourth Amendment to
searches and seizures involving technology. Because the international laws in question, such as
Article 12 of the UDHR, also refer to protections on an individual’s family, correspondence and
reputation, there are aspects of privacy rights that are not encompassed by traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. If this study were expanded to include cases that involve conceptions
of privacy found in other Amendments, such as the First or Fourteenth Amendments, it may be
possible to better understand how the Court more generally internalizes privacy norms.
Furthermore, in France there was a case that appeared before the Commercial chamber instead of
the Criminal chamber, because it involved a tax fraud investigation. Although the Court still
applied the same privacy considerations as it would in other criminal appeals, it would be
interesting to focus more specifically on how the type of investigation affects the privacy rights
that are recognized and to what extent they are affected. This could be especially relevant
because the debate on international privacy norms arose from a critique of how the U.S. National
Security Agency invaded individuals’ digital privacy for the sake of national security. By
focusing on the implications of the type of investigation, we can better understand how privacy
rights are affected differently in criminal investigations and issues of national security.
Finally, the courts chosen for my dependent variable may not properly indicate how
privacy rights are always protected. The question of privacy between the U.S. and other nations
was recently triggered by the surveillance policies of the National Security Agency. These
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policies were not reviewed by the Supreme Court, but rather the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (commonly referred to as the FISA Court). Because the FISA Court reviews
warrants for “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign power” and is not subject to the same level
of public oversight, it would likely weigh privacy concerns in a different manner from that of the
Supreme Court, yielding decisions with fewer similarities to international norms.10 A research
design focused on FISA Court actions may allow for a more comprehensive view at how privacy
rights are implicated by all surveillance related to technology, not only policies that may be
considered by the Supreme Court.
This research project evolved from a curiosity about how new technology affects
individuals’ rights to privacy, as well as how varying countries recognize these rights differently.
I wanted to explore how political culture may influence the manner in which countries
implement international law and internalize international law. By choosing France and the
United States, I could analyze the nuanced role of political culture in countries with similar
political systems and membership to international organizations. Through my study of four cases
from the U.S. Supreme Court and from the French Court of Cassation, I learned that both
countries recognize very similar rights to privacy. However, it is the process through which the
State evaluates privacy and the manner through which the Court applies privacy right protections
to questions of new technology that are affected by political culture. Although political culture
does have an influence on the process of internalization, there was a higher level of consistency
in terms of the rights recognized than I had anticipated. This suggests that political culture has an
influential role when norms are internalized but that this role is limited. The extent to which it is
limited, as well as the other specific factors that affect norm internalization are questions for
further research.
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